Compendium
Dialogues Listed Alphabetically According to English Spelling of Titles
(With the number of similes in parentheses)
| Alcibiades I (6) | Alcibiades II (6) | Apology (7) |
| Charmides (5) | Cleitophon (5) | Cratylus (9) |
| Critias (4) | Crito (3) | Epinomis (0) |
| Euthydemus (16) | Euthyphro (3) | Gorgias (17) |
| Hipparchus (1) | Hippias Major (3) | Hippias Minor (2) |
| Ion (5) | Laches (2) | Laws (66) |
| Lovers (1) | Lysis (6) | Menexenus (1) |
| Meno (4) | Minos (1) | Parmenides (6) |
| Phaedo (20) | Phaedrus (31) | Philebus (13) |
| Protagoras (21) | Republic (127) | Sophist (13) |
| Statesman (21) | Symposium (16) | Theaetetus (23) |
| Theages (0) | Timaeus (36) | Total: 500 similes |
[Laws I (5), II (2), III (2), IV (5), V (11), VI (3), VII (14), VIII (2), IX (7), X (9), XI (3), XII (3), Total = 66]
[Republic I (11), II (6), III (12), IV (12), V (11), VI (17), VII (19), VIII (18), IX (6), X (15), Total = 127]
In the following abbreviated translations introductory words (protheses) are emboldened, tenors are italicized, and vehicles are emboldened and italicized [tenor equals vehicle]. Translations are based on those in the twelve-volume series devoted to Plato in the Loeb Classical Library. Stephanus’ page numbers are placed in parentheses by the titles. Indications of the general subject of each Dialogue are given (in italics) so that one may see whether or how closely the similes are related to the subject.
Alcibiades I (St II.103a–135e) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1964 (1927) [Plato XII]
The essence of politics.
1. Alcibiades said that the Athenians and other Greeks rarely deliberate about the just versus the unjust course of action—such a question would be obvious—but rather which is more expedient (ta sympheronta). Socrates then replies that Alcibiades thinks he needs to hear new arguments (kaina atta) and different proofs (apodeixeis heteras), “as though (hôs) the earlier ones (tôn proterôn [logou]) were like (hoîon) a worn-out coat (skeuariôn katatetrimmenôn)” which he refuses to wear any more. (113d–e) Socrates [previous arguments = a worn-out coat]
2. “The men who manage the city strike me as uneducated (apaideutoi) … I suppose that anyone who tried to contend with (antagônizesthai) educated managers would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as (hôs) he would for a match with athletes (ep’ athlêtas).” (119b) Alcibiades [educated city managers = athletes] Alcibiades continues: “… as it is, I think my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.” To which Socrates exclaims, “O my, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and other advantages!” (119c)
3. “But really (atechnôs) just as in Aesop’s [fable] (kata ton Aisôpou) the remark (mython) which the fox (alôpêx) made to the lion (leonta) also is true of money going into Lacedaimon, (tou eis Lakedaimona nomismatos eisiontos) that the tracks (ta ichnê) [of something] going in are obvious (dêla) but nowhere could one see [the tracks of anything] going out (exionotos).” (123a) Socrates [money into Lacedaimon = tracks into the lion’s den]
4–5. I myself was once told by a trustworthy person that he crossed a very large tract of excellent land … which the inhabitants call (kalein) ‘the girdle of the king’s wife’ (zônên tês basileôs gynaikos) and another which was similarly called (kaleisthai) ‘her veil’ (kaluptran). (123b) Socrates [excellent land = the girdle of the king’s wife; another tract = her veil]
6. “Sir, my love will be in no way different from (ouden dioisei) a stork’s (pelargou) if, after hatching a winged love in you, it (my love) will be nourished in turn by this (i.e. by a younger stork = love).” (Alcibiades I 135e) Socrates [my love = a stork’s love] Socrates suggests that he will be nourished by the ‘winged love’ that he has implanted in Alcibiades. This is in reply to Alcibiades’ assertion that from this day on he will be always in attendance of Socrates.
Alcibiades II (St II.138a–151c) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1964 (1927) [Plato XII]
On proper prayer.
1. “You should be very careful what you pray for so that you do not find yourself praying for great evils, thinking they are good … just as (hôsper) they say that Oedipus suddenly prayed that his sons divide their patrimony with a sword.” (138b–c) Socrates [you/Alcibiades = Oedipus]
2. “For this [praying for one’s own greatest evil] would be truly similar to (homoion) some curse (katarai tini) but not to a prayer (euchêi).” (143b) Alcibiades [praying for one’s own evil = a curse (≠ a prayer)]
3. “For such is not, I think, the way of the gods to be seduced by gifts like (hoion) an evil userer (kakon tokistên).” (149e) Socrates [gods ≠ an evil userer]
4. “But it seems to me, just as (hôsper) Homer says that Athena removed the mist from Diomedes’ eyes “so that he might recognize both god and man” (Il 5. 127), so you must first have the mist (achlys) removed from your soul … so that you will be able to recognize both evil and good.” (150d–e) Socrates [you > mist from your soul = Athena > mist from Diomedes’ eyes]
5. “And like (hôsper) Creon in Euripides’ play when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths … So I take your opinion as a good omen.” (151b) Socrates [I/Socrates = Creon]
6. “For I seem to be no less wave-tossed (ouk en elattoni klydôni) than Creon (toû Kreontos) and would like to be victorious over your lovers.” (151c) Socrates [I/Socrates = Creon]
It will be observed that the final four similes appear in the last two Stephanus pages and are essentially literary references, like the first simile.
Apology (St I.17a–42a) = Harold North Fowler, LCL 1977 (1914) [Plato I]
Socrates’ defense at his trial.
1. “But there is need [for me] to shadowbox, as it were, (hôsper skiamachein) in defending myself and examine him (although) no one (is) answering.” (18d) Socrates [I/Socrates defend = shadow-box]
2. “But it is necessary to show you my wandering (planên) as though (hôsper) of someone performing [Herculean] labors (ponous tinas ponountos), so that the oracle may be proved irrefutable.” (22a) Socrates [I/Socrates = Heracles (implied, as in H. N. Fowler’s translation in the Loeb Classical Library, 1914, 85)] “Socrates casts himself as a latter day Heracles, whose labors are commonly described in Greek literature as ponoi. Note the alliteration” (Miller 2010:49).
3. “If you kill me, you will not easily find another such person, as it were—if I may speak somewhat humorously, attached to this city by the god, as though a large and noble horse (hôsper hippô megalô) lazy because of its size and needing to be waked up by some gadfly (hypo myôpos). I think the god attached me to this city in some such way.” (30e) Socrates [I/Socrates > Athens = a gadfly > horse]
4. “You (hymeîs), like (hôsper) people awakened from a nap (hoi nystazontes egeiromenoi) …” (31a) Socrates [you (Athenians) = people awakened from a nap]
5. “I (egô) happen to be someone (tyngchanô ôn toioûtos) such as (hoîos) has been given to the city by the god.” (31a–b) Socrates [I = someone given to Athens by the god]
6. “To die (to tethnanai) is either one of two things: either it is like (hoîon) being nothing (mêden eînai) and having no perception of anything or it is, as people say, some change (metabolê tis) and transplantation (metoikêsis) for the soul from here to another place.” (40c) Socrates [death = being nothing or some change and transplantation of the soul] In the next section (40d) he repeats this possibility.
7. “And if it [death] is unconsciousness [no perception] but like sleep (hoîon hypnos) when someone sleeping sees not even a dream, then death would be a wonderful gain.” (40d) Socrates [death = sleep]
Note that the more colorful similes (1–5) occur in Socrates’ first speech (17–35d), that none occurs in the second (his reaction to the conviction, 35e–38c), and only the bland comparisons of death to some state like sleep or transplantation occur in the third (38c–42a).
Charmides (St II.153a–176d) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1964 (1927) [Plato XII]
Socrates has returned from the fighting at Potidaea (432 BC) and gives his friends the news, which is not included in the Dialogue (on sophosyne or temperance).
1. “I am nothing to be judged by (stathmêton = a measurer); for I am (eimi) actually (atechnôs) a white line (leukê stathmê) with respect to handsome men, for almost everyone who is in this period of life appears handsome to me.” (154b) Socrates [I/Socrates = a carpenter’s measuring line (therefore useless in marking on white marble)]
2. But everyone gazed at him (Charmides) like (hôsper = as if he were) a statue (hôsper agalma). (154c) Socrates [Charmides = a statue]
3. “‘(You) beware of coming (elthonta) [as] a fawn before a lion (leontos nebron) and being seized [as] his portion of flesh.’ For I felt I had fallen a prey to some such creature.” (155d) Socrates quoting the poet Cydias as a warning, when he (Socrates) saw inside Charmides’ cloak and “caught fire” and “lost control of himself”. [you > Charmides = fawn > lion]
A common metaphor; see Catullus’ carmen 64.93 for the image of ‘catching fire’, in reference to Ariadne’s passion for Theseus: non prius ex illo flagrantia declinavit / lumina, quam cuncto concepit corpore flammam / funditus atque imis exarsit tota medullis. (Literally: “She did not turn her burning eyes from him until she caught fire deep down in her whole body and was totally ablaze in her inmost marrow.”)
4. But he (Critias) seemed to have become as angry with him (Charmides) as (hôsper) a poet (poiêtês) with an actor (hypocritêi) who delivers his verses badly. (162d) Socrates [Critias > Charmides = a poet > an actor]
5. When Critias saw me in difficulty, he seemed to me—just as (hôsper) the sight of someone yawning causes people to be affected in a similar way—to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in difficulty (aporia) himself. (169c) Socrates [Critias > me = people > (seeing) someone yawning]
Cleitophon (St III.406a–410e) = Rev. R. G. Bury, LCL 1942 (1929) [Plato VII (IX)]
Socrates speaks only twice (one sentence each time) in this short Dialogue (the shortest in the entire corpus), in the Introductory section to Cleitophon’s complaint about Socrates.
1. “If it is necessary to live, it is better for such a person to spend his life as a slave rather than a free man, handing over the rudder of his will, as it were, of a ship (kathaper ploiou paradonti ta pêdalia tês dianoias) to someone else who knows the art of steering men (kybernêtikê anthrôpôn), which is what you often call (eponomazeis pollakis) politics (politikên), Socrates.” (408a–b) Cleitophon [one’s will = rudder of a ship]
2. “I have scarcely ever spoken out against these [arguments (logoi)] nor will I speak against them later, [because] I regard them as most valuable and beneficial, actually able to wake us up, as though we are sleeping (atechnôs hôsper katheudontas) …” (408c) Cleitophon [philosophical dullness (we are awake) = slumber (we are sleeping)]
3–4. “How should we to begin the study of justice? Just as if (hôsper an ei tis) someone were exhorting us to care for our bodies, seeing that we like children (kathaper paîdas) did not see that there is such a thing as gymnastics and medicine.” (408e) Cleitophon [pursuit of justice = care for body; we = children]
5. “Thinking that you are the best of men at exhorting people to a concern for virtue, yet [I saw that] of these two alternatives one must be true: either you are … like (hoîon) a man who is no steersman composing a eulogy of it [i.e. you don’t have the knowledge] … or … you possess the knowledge but are not willing to share it with me.” (410 b–c) Cleitophon [Socrates exhorting people to virtue = a man who is no steersman composing a eulogy of sailing]
Cleitophon uses a small ‘cluster’ of similes (1–4) on one page of Stephanus (408).
Cratylus (St I.383a–440e) = H. N. Fowler LCL 1977 (1926) [Plato IV]
On the origin of language.
1–2. “A name is (estin) a kind of teaching instrument (didaskalikon ti organon) and one that separates reality like (hôsper) a shuttle [is an instrument for separating] fabric (kerkis hyphasmatos).” (388b–c) Socrates [name = teaching instrument = shuttle in fabric] Here the first ‘simile’ (predicate) is barely more than a definition, whereas the second is a more figurative comparison introduced to clarify the first.
The discussion is based on the dichotomy of names as convention (nomos) by Hermogenes versus names as significant nature (physis) by Socrates.
3. “Socrates, you seem to be uttering oracles, exactly like (atechnôs ge moi dokeîs hôsper) an inspired prophet.” (396d) Hermogenes [Socrates = an inspired prophet]
4. “Falsehood (to pseûdos) … [is: esti in previous sentence] rough and [like a] tragic goat (tragikon); for tales (mythoi) and falsehoods are most at home there, in the tragic life (peri ton tragikon bion).” (408c) Socrates [falsehood = a tragic goat] NB this illustrates a denominative simile (expressed by an adjective) translated as a simple simile.
5. “Just now when you pronounced boulapteroun [an awkward compound word from boulomenon + haptein + rhoûn meaning “that which wishes to fasten the flow”], you looked as if (hôsper) you had made up your mind to whistle the flute-prelude of the hymn to Athena (toû tês Athênâa nomoû proaulion stomaulesai].” (417e) Hermocrates to Socrates [Socrates pronouncing a word = whistling the hymn to Athena] Presumably he is making fun of Socrates’ protruding lips in pronouncing this awkward word.
6. “Necessity [To anangkaîon] is likened to (apeikastai) walking through a ravine (têi kata ta angkê poreiai) … the word may thus originate in a comparison with (apeikasthen) progress through a ravine.” (420d–e) Socrates [Necessity/To anangkaîon = walking through a ravine]
7. “Just as painters (hôsper zôgraphoi) … in just this way (houtô) we too shall apply letters to things.” (424d) Socrates [we too = painters]
8–9. “But surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names or trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he knows anything; nor … will he say that all things (panta) are flowing like [leaky] jars (hôsper keramia rhei) and, as it were, like (atechnôs hôsper) people sick with catarrh.” (440c) Socrates (who says that this theory is not necessarily correct: 440d) [all things = leaky pots = people sick with a cold]
Critias (St III.106a–121c) = Rev. R. G. Bury, LCL 1942 (1929) [Plato VII (IX)]
The story of the mighty island kingdom Atlantis and its attempt to conquer Athens.
Planned as a sequel to the Republic and Timaeus. At the beginning of his narrative (107c–e) Critias pleads for indulgence by citing the way we look at paintings (tên tôn grapheôn eidôlopoiian), where imitation and representation (mimêsin kai apeikasian) must be judged. We tolerate inexactness when it comes to portraying nature and the heavens but in likenesses of our own bodies we quickly perceive what is defective because of our greater familiarity with them. Thus his subject corresponds to the latter, whereas Timaeus portrayed more remote actions.
1. “How gladly am I now set free from the journey of our conversation (ek toû logou diaporeias), Socrates, as though (hoîon) resting from a long trip (ek makrâs hodoû)!” (106a) Timaeus [the journey of our conversation = a long trip]
2–3. “They [the gods] settled their lands, and when they had finished, they nourished us, as herdsmen [care for] their flocks (hoîon nomês poimnia), possessions and herds, except not using (c) bodily force, like shepherds guiding their flocks with a stroke [of a staff] (kathaper poimenes ktênê plêgêi nemontes), but guiding from the stern where a living creature is easiest to direct, touching the soul by persuasion, as by a rudder (hoîon oiaki), according to their own intention; and thus driving them they steered all the mortal kind.” (109b–c) Critias [gods > Greeks = herdsmen or shepherds > flocks; by persuasion = by a rudder]
4. “And just as (kathaper) [happens] on small islands, compared with what then existed, what is left [is] like (hoîon) the bones of a sick body (nosêsantos sômatos ostâ), all the fat and soft earth having wasted away, and only the bare body of the land being left.” (111b) Critias [our land now = a small island = the bones of a sick body]
NB that in Critias’ detailed description of ancient Athens and Atlantis, there are no similes such as are found in Timaeus’ account of the world.
Crito (St I.43a–54e) = Harold North Fowler, LCL 1977 (1914) [Plato I]
On justice and the appropriate response to injustice.
1. “Know well that I shall not yield to you, not even if the power of the multitude (hê dynamis tôn pollôn) frighten us with even more terrors than at present, just as (hôsper) children are frightened by goblins (paîdas hêmâs mormoluttêtai).” (44c) Socrates [we frightened by terrors = children frightened by goblins]
2. “Your country (patris) is more valuable and precious and more to be revered than your mother and father and all other ancestors.” (51a–b) Socrates [our country = mother/father/ancestors]
3. “Know well, O Crito, that I seem to hear them [the laws], just as (hôsper) the Corybants seem to hear the auloi.” (54d) Socrates [I/Socrates > the Laws of Athens = Corybants > the ‘flutes’ of Cybele]
Epinomis (St II.973a–992e) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1927 [Plato XII]
A continuation of the Laws.
This Dialogue lacks almost all literary embellishments, including similes. Lamb calls it “a forgery” by “an inferior mind” (424), whose primary object is to supplement a passage at the end of Laws (12.966–7) about the training of the Nocturnal Council. However, we may note the alliteration near the beginning of the Dialogue (973c–d): “But one may rightly hope (tis prothymoit’ an) to attain after death (teleutêsanti tychein) all the things for whose sake one may strive both in life to live as nobly as one can (zôn te hôs kallist’ an zên kata dynamin) and in death to find such a [noble] end (kai teleutêsas teleutês toiautês tychein). (Cleinias)
Also note two adages quoted by the Athenian Visitor: “a man learns aright (orthôs) by keeping his gaze on unity (eis hen)” (991e); and “to neglect the gods is not permitted (amelêsai de ou themiton esti theôn)” (992a). Thus at the beginning and ending of the Dialogue alliteration calls attention to wise sayings.
Euthydemus (St I.271a–307c) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1977 (1924) [Plato II]
Socratic argumentation versus sophistic eristics.
E. H. Gifford says (10) that “the dramatic form is more prominent … than in any other of the Platonic dialogues” and distinguishes five dramatic episodes following a prologue and ending with an epilogue: scene 1 (starting at 272e), scene 2 (277d), scene 3 (283a), scene 4 (288b), and scene 5 (293d). R. S. W. Hawtry notes (63) that “these divisions are marked generally by narrative … and often by a striking simile.” As examples he cites Euthydemus 3 and Euthydemus 4 (below).
1. “When he said this, like (hôsper) a chorus (hoi agathai orchêstai) given a signal by a didaskalos (hypo didaskalou choros aposêmêmantas), the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus shouted and laughed at the same time.” (276b) Socrates [the followers > Dionysodorus and Euthydemus = a chorus > the didaskolos (chorus teacher)] This simile follows the analogy of citharist and grammatist as didaskaloi mentioned a few lines earlier (276a). The clustering of six vivid similes in three Stephanus pages (276–278) emphasizes the playful nature of this Dialogue.
2. “Euthydemos … did not let the boy go but continued to ask questions and like [hôsper] good dancers (hoi agathoi orchêstai) turned the questions around doubling on the same point.” (276d) Socrates [Euthydemus = a good dancer]
3. “Euthydemus had hardly spoken when Dionysodorus caught the line of argument (logos) like a ball (hôsper sphairan) and aimed it at the lad (estochazeto tou meirakiou).” (277b) Socrates [logos = a ball]
Hawtry (67) again observes the use of this simile: “Once more a vivid image marks a structural point; the logos is the ball … appropriate enough in a gymnasium.”
4. “Euthydemus still continued to rush at the lad having thrown him [in debate] for the third time as [hôsper] in wrestling.” (277c) Socrates [Euthydemus in debate = winning wrestler] See Hawtrey’s commentary (especially 63 and 67) on Plato’s use of the similes to mark the shifts in narrative. Lee (1964) also says in passing (without much demonstration) that in the Iliad “similes are used to open as well as to close scenes” (4n19).
5. “They are acting just like (poieîton taûton hoper) the celebrants (hoi en têi teletêi).” (277d) Socrates [Euthydemos and Dionysodorus = the celebrants] There follows a long sentence explaining the comparison.
In reference to this passage Hawtrey says (70): “Once more a structural point in the dialogue is marked by vigorous images; compare 276b.6ff., d5ff., 277b3ff.” In his introduction (34) Hawtrey discusses the imagery of this Dialogue briefly and alludes to some of the similes below.
6. “I call it a sport (paidian) … because of the differences in the sense of the words, by tripping them up and overturning them; just as [hôsper] those who slyly pull stools away from persons who are about to sit down … laugh when they see someone sprawling on his back (hyption anatetrammenon).” (278b) Socrates [those playing word games = people who pull stools away from someone about to sit down]
7. “I am ready to hand myself over to Dionysodorus here as if (hôsper) he were the [famous] Medea of Colchis.” (285c) Socrates [Dionysodorus = Medea]
8. “I too, Socrates, am ready to offer myself to be skinned by the visitors … if my hide is not to end up being made into a wine-skin, like [hôsper] Marsyas’, but into the shape of virtue.” (285c–d) Ctesippus [my hide ≠ Marsyas’ hide, but = virtue (≠ a wine-skin)] A simile parallel with the previous one.
9. “I see certain speech-writers (logopoious) who do not know how to use the special arguments (tois idiois logois) which they themselves have made, like (hôsper) lyre-makers [who cannot play] the lyres (hoi lyropoioi taîs lyrais) which they made.” (289d) Cleinias [speech-writers = lyre-makers]
At 290a Socrates makes an analogy between the sorcerer’s art (he tôn epôdôn technê)—charming (kêlêsis) of snakes and scorpions etc.—and the speech-writer’s art—the charming and soothing (paramythia) of juries, assemblies and crowds.
10–11. “We were as funny as [hôsper] children chasing larks (korydous): we always thought we would catch one of the epistemes (types of knowledge) but they always escaped… Then like [hôsper] people who have fallen into a labyrinth, thinking that we were at the end, turning back around we realized that we were, as it were [hôsper], at the beginning of the investigation.” (291b–c) Socrates [we/Socrates in our investigation = children chasing larks = people fallen into a labyrinth and back where they started]
Socrates answers Crito’s question whether Socrates found the object of his search for the art that knows how to use what it has acquired.
12. “Finding I had fallen into this perplexity, I began to exclaim at the top of my voice, beseeching the two strangers (toîs xenoin), as though (hôsper) I were calling upon the Heavenly Twins (Dioskourôn epikaloumenos), to save us (sôsai hêmâs), the lad and myself, from the mighty wave of argument (ek tês trikymias toû logou). (293a) Socrates (293a) [the two strangers = the Dioskouroi]
13. They most valiantly answered his (Ctesippus’) questions … like [hôsper] boars (kaproi) when driven up to face the spears. (294d) Socrates [Euthydemos and Dionysodorus > questions = boars > spears]
14. “I am much weaker (phauloteros) than Heracles (tou Hêrakleous) who was no match for the Hydra, that she-professor (sophistria) who was so clever that she sent forth many heads of debate (tou logou) for each one that was cut off.” (297c) Socrates [I/Socrates > both of you = Heracles > heads of the Hydra] Socrates uses the simile of cutting off the Hydra’s head at Republic 426e for enacting and amending certain laws trying to find a way to put an end to frauds in business.
15. “But, Dionysiodorus, you seem to be finishing off your dialogue very well, like [hôsper] craftsmen (dêmiourgoi) who put the final touches on each of their products.” (301c) Socrates [Euthydemos and Dionysodorus > dialogue = craftsmen > products]
16. “Tell me, Socrates,” he [Dionysiodorus] said, “do you have an ancestral Zeus?” I, suspecting that the discussion would arrive at the place where it did end, by some difficult twist tried to escape and began to turn now like (hôsper) a [fish or animal] caught in a net (diktyôi), and said, “No, I do not, O Dionysodorus.” (302b) Socrates [I/Socrates > the discussion = a fish or animal > (caught in) a net] Socrates adds that he was “knocked out, as it were, by the argument (hôsper plêgeis hypo tou logou) and lay speechless (eneimên aphônos).”
Euthyphro (St I.2a–16a) = H. N. Fowler, LCL 1928 (1914) [Plato I]
On piety or holiness (to hosion).
1. “He [Meletus] comes to accuse me to the city like (hôsper) a boy to his mother.” (2c) Socrates [Meletus > the city = a boy > his mother]
Note Socrates’ detailed description of Meletus in the previous sentence (2b): “His name is Meletus, I believe. And he is of the deme of Pitthus, if you remember any Pitthian Meletus, with long hair and only a little beard, but with a hooked nose” (in Harold North Fowler’s translation, Loeb Classical Library, 7–9, 1982 [1927]).
2. “It is correct [for good civic leaders] first to take care of the young so that they will be as good as possible just as [(hôsper) it is natural] for a good farmer (geôrgon agathon) first to take care of his young plants (phytôn).” (2d) Socrates [a good leader > the young = a good farmer > his plants]
See Phaedrus 276c (below) for Socrates’ simile of the farmer who is careful about planting seeds in suitable soil (underlining the importance of planting the seeds of the dialectic method in a fitting soul).
3. “Your statements are like (heoîken) [the works] of my ancestor Daedalus … they are not willing to stay where someone puts them.” (11b–c) Socrates [Euthyphro’s statements = the unstable works of Daedalus]
Gorgias St I.447a–527e = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1953 (1925) [Plato III]
True rhetoric versus sophistic oratory.
1–2. “Their achievements [tyrants and other wrong-doers] are as if (hôsper) someone suffering a serious illness does not go to doctors (toîs megistois nosêmasi) to be healed out of fear, like a child (hôsperanei paîs) afraid of the pain of cautery and surgery.” (479a) Socrates [tyrants and wrongdoers = a sick person afraid of a doctor = a child afraid of surgery] The first similes in this long Dialogue occur only at the end of Part 2: 447–460 (Part 1, Socrates vs Gorgias); 461–480 (Part 2—Socrates vs Polus); most are introduced during the encounter with Callicles (481–end).
3. “If anyone does wrong, he ought to go to the judge (para ton dikastên) as to a doctor (hôsper para ton iatron) so that the disease of his injustice (to nosêma tês adikias) not make his soul uncurable.” (480a–b) Socrates [judge (dikastês) > injustice (adikia) = doctor (iatros) > disease (nosêma)] This simile continues in 480c in Socrates’ insistence that a guilty man ought to submit to punishment for injustice “as though (hôsper) to the cutting and turning of the surgeon (iatrôi).” Note also the ‘genitive similitic’ expression “the disease of his injustice (to nosêma tês adikias)”.
4. “I’d rather have my lyre (tên lyran) out of tune and discordant (anharmostan te kai diaphônein) … than (mâllon ê) have internal discord and contradiction in myself (ena onta eme emautôi asymphônon einai kai enantia legein).” (482b–c) Socrates (internal discord = a lyre out of tune).
5. “We mold the best and strongest among us, taking them from their infancy like lions (hôsper leontas).” (483e) Callicles [the best and strongest among us = lions ]
6. Callicles quotes Pindar: “Law [is] the king of all, men and gods alike” (nomos ho pantôn basileus). (484b) Callicles [law = king] Cf. Protagoras 11 (below) for Hippias’ personification of custom as ‘tyrant over men’ (337d): “The personification of abstract concepts … is not uncommon in Greek poetry.” [1]
7. “To have a taste of philosophy is all right for the sake of education (philosophia men hoson paideias charin kalon metechein) … but when a more mature person still philosophizes … it is laughable (katagelaston) … I have a very similar feeling (homoiotaton paschô) about philosophers (tous philosophoûntas) as about those who stammer and play childish games (hôsper pros tous psellizomenous kai paizontas).” (485a–b) “But when I see an elderly man still philosophising, I think he needs a whipping (plêgôn) [for his unmanly behavior].” (485d) “… leaving these pretty toys to others!” (486c) Callicles [philosophers = people who stammer and play childish games]
8. “I am well disposed towards you, Socrates, and feel somewhat like Zethus towards Amphion in Euripides’ play (kindyneuô oûn peponthenai nûn hoper ho Zêthos pros ton Amphiona ho Euripidou): ‘You are careless of what you should care for (Ameleîs hôn deî se epimeleîsthai)’ etc.” (485e) Callicles [Callicles to Socrates = Zethus to Amphion] Cf. 506c, another allusion to this comparison. In the next few pages as Callicles begins to become exasperated at the course of the argument (“won’t this man stop drivelling nonsense [phlyarôn]?”), Socrates addresses him ironically as “most sapient” (ô sophôtate), “my wonderful friend” (ô daimonie), and “admirable sir” (ô thaumasie)—to which Callicles replies (489e), “You are being sarcastic/ironic (eirôneuêi), Socrates.” Socrates denies this: “No, by Zethus, whom you used just now for aiming a good deal of sarcasm at me (polla nundê eirôneuou pros me).”
9. “In fact (tôi onti) I also heard one of our sages (sophous) [say] that we are now (actually) dead and that the body (sôma) is (estin) our tomb (sêma).” (493a) Socrates [body = a tomb]
10. “Some man clever at mythologizing … and playing on the name (paragôn tôi onomati) named (ônomase) the persuadable (peisticon) part of the soul a pitcher (pithon) since it is credulous (pithanon) and he called (onômase) ‘mindless’ (anoêtous) people ‘uninitiated’ (amyêtous), (b) and the part of the soul of the mindless where their desires (epithymiai) are [he called] its intemperate and leaky [part] (ou steganon = not watertight), comparing (apeikasas) it as though it were a leaky pitcher (hôs tetrêmenos pithos) because it is insatiate. (493a–b) Socrates [part of the soul = a (leaky) pitcher]
11. “He (my informant) says the soul (psychên) is a sieve (koskinon). He compared (apêkasen) the soul of fools (anoêtôn) to a sieve (koskinôi) as being perforated (hôs tetrêmenên), since it is unable to hold anything because of its undependability and forgetfulness.” (493c) Socrates [the soul of fools = a sieve]
At 493d Socrates begins to construct another illustration (allên eikona) “from the same school as the first” (ek ton autou gymnasiou têi nûn) about two men (sôphrôn vs akolastos) with jars, one of whom has to keep filling his because of leaks.
12. “This is, as I was just saying, to live like a stone” (to hôsper lithon zên) when one is full, feeling neither pleasure nor pain, whereas a comfortable life consists in this: [having] the largest amount of inflow. (494a–b) Callicles [to live thus = to be a stone]
13. “You are describing some (tina) life of a plover” (charadrios, a greedy and messy bird) but NOT of a corpse or of a stone. (494b) … Tell me first if it is possible (esti) for someone, itching and scratching … to his heart’s content, to spend his life happily in continual scratching.” (494c) Socrates [the life of someone constantly gratifying himself = the life of a plover]
14. Note the use of atechnôs in similes: “What an odd person (atopos) you are (eî), Socrates, a regular stump-orator (atechnôs dêmêgoros)!” (494d) Callicles [Socrates = a stump-orator] These six similes (9–14), occurring within two pages of Stephanus (493–494) indicate the intensity of the argument between Socrates and Callicles, which Socrates says is “bordering on the absurd” (epieikôs … hypo ti atopa), but “it illustrates what I wish to impress upon you … to choose an orderly life … content with what it has.” Callicles, however, is not convinced (494a): “You don’t persuade me, Socrates … that is living like a stone” (12 above), to which Socrates applies a different image (14).
15. “O Callicles, what a rascal you are, treating me like a child (chrêi moi hôsper paidi). (499c) Socrates [me = a child] This is in reply to Callicles’ taunt that Socrates takes puerile delight in clinging “to any concession one may make you even in jest like children (hôsper ta meirakia).”
16. “I am (eimi) at the mercy of anyone who wishes (epi tôi boulomenôi), like (hôsper) an outlaw(s) (hoi atimoi), to the whim of anyone who chooses to give me—the dashing phrase is yours (to neanikon dê toûto toû soû logoû)—a box on the ear (an te typtein epi korrês).” (508c) Socrates [I/Socrates = an outlaw]
17. “I will be judged (krinoûmai) as (hôs) a doctor (ego = iatros) might be judged (krinoito) among children on a charge brought by a cook (katêgorountos opsopoioû).” (521e) Socrates [I/Socrates = a doctor on trial by children] Cf. 464d: “If a cook and a doctor had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, as to which understands the questions of good and bad foods, … the doctor would starve to death.”
Hipparchus (St II.225a–232c) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1964 (1927) [Plato VIII (XII)] On greed. (philokerdês = lover of gain)
1. “Well then, as though (hôsper) playing draughts (or checkers, petteuôn), I am willing to return to you in our conversation anything you wish of the things you have said, so that you won’t think you are being deceived.” (229e) Socrates [I/Socrates = board-game-player]
Notice Socrates’ punning phrase earlier in the Dialogue (225e): kai hôra kai chôra (‘season and soil’, a word jingle), followed by Socrates’ apologetic clause, “if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases (tôn sophôn rheumatôn) which adroit pleaders (hoi dexioi) use to trick out (kalliepoûntai) their speeches in the law courts.” (Lamb’s translation, p. 281); and the maxims of Hipparchus that Socrates quotes at 229 a–b: “walk with just intent” (steîche dikaia phronôn) and “deceive not a friend” (mê philon exapata) after the Delphic sayings “Know thyself” (gnothi sauton) and “Nothing in excess” (mêden agan). Also interesting are the numerous ‘negative’ analogies that Socrates offers early in the Dialogue: farmers (225b), horsemen (226a), navigator (226d), general (226c), flute-player, harper, horseman, and other craftsmen (dêmiourgôn).
At 232b Hipparchus says that Socrates’ argument (logos) has ‘compelled’ (ênangkake) him rather than ‘persuaded’ (pepeiken) him that all gains, both small and great, are good. At any rate, in the concluding sentence (232c) Socrates states that it is not right to reproach anyone with being a lover of gain (contra Hipparchus who had said at the beginning of the Dialogue that lovers of gain were not fools (anoêtous) but ‘rascals’ (panourgous) and ‘wicked’ (ponêtous).
Hippias Major (St III.281a–304e) H. N. Fowler, LCL 1977 (1926) [Plato IV]
What is beauty (to kalon)?
1. “Just as other arts (hôsper hai allai technai) have progressed and the ancients are of no account (phaûloi) in comparison with artisans today, thus also (houtô kai) your art has progressed and [the wise men (hoi sophoi)] of the ancients are of no account (phaûloi) in comparison with you. If Bias were to come to life again now, he would be a laughing-stock in comparison with you, just as (hôsper) sculptors say that Daedalus, if he were born now … would be ridiculous.” (281d–282a) Socrates [you (Hippias) > Bias = sculptors > Daedalus]
2. “I realize that in all likelihood the Lacedaimonians welcome you [Hippias] because of your wide knowledge, and they use you as (hôsper) children treat old women (tais presbutisin) to tell pleasant stories.” (285e–286a) Socrates [Lacedaimonians > you (Hippias) = children > old women who tell stories]
3. “[‘What is beauty’ is my question.] I cannot shout it out any more than if you were sitting beside (parekathêso) me [like] a rock (lithos), or (kai) even a millstone (mylias), with neither ears nor a brain.” (292d) Socrates (imagining what his ‘friend’ would say to him) [you/Socrates = a rock or a millstone]
Socrates refers to this person at 288d: “someone not elegant (komphos) but vulgar (syrphetos), concerned with nothing more than the truth” and 298d: “the man I mean, or someone else.”
Hippias Minor (St I.363a–376c ) H. N. Fowler, LCL 1977 (1926) [Plato IV]
On lying (and doing evil voluntarily, peri tou pseudous—on falsehood)
1. “Hateful to me as (homôs, literally ‘equally [to]’) the gates of Hades (Aïdao pylêisin) [is] he who hides one thing in his heart and says another.” (365a–b) Hippias quoting Achilles in Homer’s Iliad 9.312 [a deceiving hypocrite = the gates of Hades]
2. “Do you say that the false (pseudeîs) are like (hôsper) the sick (tous kamnontes) without the power to do anything?” (365d) Socrates [the false = the sick]
There are several simple comparisons: e.g. “Homer’s Iliad is a finer poem than his Odyssey” (Socrates quoting Apemantus at 363b); “I have never met anyone better than myself (kreittoni emautou) in anything” (Hippias at 364a); “Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus” (364c ff); “I have no doubt that you are wiser than I, Hippias” (369d); “Socrates always makes confusion in arguments and is like (hôsper) a trouble-maker (kakourgounti, 373b)”; plus many analogies in argument.
Ion (St I.530a–542b) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1975 (1925) [Plato VIII]
On the art of poetry (skill versus divine possession).
1. “This is not an art (toûto technê ouk on) in you by which you speak well about Homer (peri Homêrou oû legein), as I was just saying, but a divine power which moves you (theia dynamis hê se kineî), like [that] in the stone (hôsper en têi lithô) which Euripides called a Magnet but most people call a Heraclean [stone].” (533d) Socrates [(your ability to speak about Homer =) a divine power (≠ an art) = a magnet or Heraclean stone]
Socrates explains this by no means self-evident comparison (533d–e) as follows: just as a stone “attracts iron rings and imparts to them a power whereby they in turn are able to … attract other rings … in the same way the Muse inspires men … and then by means of these inspired persons the inspiration spreads to others … For all good epic poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed …”
2. “Just as (hôsper) the Corybantes [worshippers] do not dance when sober (emphrones ontes), so the lyric poets are not sober when they compose these beautiful poems, but whenever they enter into their harmony and rhythm, they are reveling and possessed (katechomenoi) just as (hôsper) the bacchants are possessed when they draw honey and milk from the rivers.” (534a) Socrates [lyric poets = Corybantian worshippers and bacchants]
3. “ For the poets no doubt tell us that they bring us songs from honey-flowing fountains culling them from the glens and gardens of the Muses like bees (hôsper hai melittai) [bring honey] and flying in the same way.” (534a–b) Socrates [poets bring songs = bees (bring honey)]
4. “For a poet (poêtês) is (esti) a light (koûphon) and winged (ptênon) and sacred (hieron) thing (chrêma) … inspired (entheos) and out of his senses (ekphrôn).” (534b) Socrates [poet = winged and sacred thing etc.)
5. “You are like a perfect Proteus (atechnôs hôsper ho Prôteus) in the way you take on every sort of shape, twisting about until you at last elude my grasp in the guise of a general. (541e) Socrates [you (Ion) = (elusive) Proteus]
Socrates uses four similes (1–4) in one page (533d–534b) to reinforce his argument that “poets are merely interpreters of gods” (534e: poêtai ouden all’ ê hermênês eisi tôn theôn). His final simile (5) several pages later expresses his frustration at Ion’s elusiveness.
Laches (St II.178a–201c ) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1977 (1924) [Plato II]
On courage (andreia)
1. “Anyone who won honour among them for this art [fighting in armour] would amass great riches elsewhere, just as (hôsper) a tragic poet (tragôidias poiêtês) does who has won honour among us.” (183a) Laches [a fighter there = a tragic poet here]
2. “And so in fact this is not a thing which, as the proverb says (kata tên paroimian), “any pig (pâsa hys) would know”; and thus a pig cannot be courageous.” (Socrates) “I think not.” (Nicias) “Indeed it is obvious, Nicias, that you at least do not believe that even the Crommyonian sow (or “a pig as big as the Crommyonian sow”) could have been courageous.” (196 d–e) Socrates [a pig ≠ the Crommyonian sow]
One may see a simile hidden in this formulaic language since both tenor (pig) and vehicle (Crommyonian sow) are stated. This kind of expression uses exaggeration to make its point and a mythical personage is introduced to strengthen the comparison. Thus the words ‘not even’ (oude in Greek) introduce the simile, with the prothesis ‘as big as’ only implied. Jowett in fact renders it as a simile: “not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow.” (B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, vol 1, 3rd Edition, 1892 [Oxford: at the Clarendon Press] 106) See also the pig references at Lovers 134b and 166c–d.
Laws I (624–650) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato X]
On temperance.
1. “For imagine a man supposing that if (homoion hôs ei) a human body (sôma) was best off when it is sick … similarly (hôsautôs) with regard to the well-being of a state (pros poleôs eudaimonian).” (628d) Athenian Visitor [2] [human body = state]
2. “Pleasure and pain (tas hêdonas kai tas lypas) … These [are the] two fountains (duo gar hautai pêgai metheintai physei rhein) [which] gush out by nature’s impulse.” (636d) Athenian Visitor [pleasure and pain = two fountains]
3. “All who take up an institution (epitêdeuma) for discussion and propose, at its first meeting, to censure or commend it, are proceeding in quite the wrong way. Their action is like that of a man (tauton poieîn hoîon ei de tis) who when he hears somebody praising cheese (toryn), at once starts to disparage it … This is what we are doing about drunkenness (methês).” (638c) Athenian Visitor [All who discuss (wrongly) drunkenness = a man who disparages cheese]
4–5. “Let us suppose (hêgêsômetha) that each of us living creatures [is] an ingenious puppet of the gods (thauma … theîon), whether as a toy (paignion) or for some serious purpose. Our inward affections, like (hoîon) sinews or cords drag us along … and pull us in opposite directions.” (644d) Athenian Visitor [each of us = puppet of the gods; our inward affections = sinews or cords]
Laws II (652–674) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato X]
Music and dancing.
1. “Then we must track down (hêmîn … diereunêteon) good posture (schêma kalon) like hounds on the trail (kathaper kysin ichneuousais).” (654e) Athenian Visitor [we = hounds]
2. “You keep your young people (tou neois) massed together like a herd of goats at grass (hoîon athroous pôlous en agelêi nemomenous).” (666e) Athenian Visitor [your young people = herd of goats]
Laws III (676–702) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato X]
Historical survey.
1. “Following their [parents] they (hoi tote = those who lived after the great flood [678b + 682b + 685a]) will form a single flock like birds (kathaper ornithes). (680e) Athenian Visitor [early humans = birds]
NB the alliteration at 685a: peri nomôn paizontas paidian presbutikên sôphrona (“indulging in an old man’s sober play with laws”).
2. (a) “I must rein in my speech like a horse (hoîonper hippon) and not be carried away by it, (b) as though it had no bridle in its mouth (kathaper achalinon), so that I do not fall off the donkey (onou), as the proverb (tên paroimian) goes.” (701c–d) Athenian Visitor [logos = an unbridled horse]; Bury (249n3) points out the pun implied by the proverb of ‘falling off a donkey’ (apo … onou) for ‘speaking out of one’s mind’ (apo nou) or ‘show myself a fool.’
Laws IV (704–724) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato X]
Establishment of the new city.
1. “I consider that only this law (nomos) is correctly enacted which aims (stochazêtai) like an archer (dikên toxotou) at that which is associated with something beautiful.” (705e) Athenian Visitor [law = archer]; Cf. the same simile in Book Eleven below (Bk 11.1).
2. “Settlements would not be so easy for cities as those when, like (ton tropon) a swarm (esmôn: of bees), a single clan goes out from a single city and settles down.” (708b) Athenian Visitor [a single clan of citizens = a swarm (of bees)]
3. “On the other hand, the clan (genos) formed by the fusion of various elements would perhaps be more ready to submit to new laws, but to cause it to share in one spirit and pant (as they say) in unison like a team of horses (kathaper hippôn zeûgos) would be a lengthy and difficult task.” (708d) Athenian Visitor [clan = a team of horses]
4. “There is an ancient saying … that whenever a poet is seated on the Muse’s tripod, he is not in his senses (emphrôn) but is like some fountain (hoion krênê tis) which allows the upward flowing water to flow freely.” (719c) Athenian Visitor [poet on the Muse’s tripod = a fountain]
5. “Just as (kathaper) one doctor is accustomed to treat us [patients] in one way, another in another way, so we beg the lawmaker, as (kathaper) children beg a doctor to give them the mildest treatment.” (720a) Athenian Visitor [we > lawmakers = children > a doctor]
Laws V (726–747) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato X]
Regulations for citizens and households.
Book Five is a monologue by the Athenian Visitor, with hypothetical questions introduced at 743a and Clinias’ final sentence. There is a long prologue on the soul as man’s most divine possession.
1. “One should show pity (to the wrongdoer) and abate one’s passion … and not keep on raging [like] a scolding wife (mê akracholoûnta gynaikeîôs pikrainomenon diateleîn). (731d) Athenian Visitor [one ≠ scolding wife(ly)] A denominative (adverbial) simile.
2. “Just as (hôsper) there must be an opposite inflow whenever there is an outflow (aporrheontos), [so] when wisdom (phronêseôs) flies away, recollection (anamnêsis) is the inflow (epirrhoê).” (732b) Athenian Visitor [recollection > wisdom = inflow > outflow]
3. “Just as (kathaper) in any woven article (plegma) it is not possible to make both warp and woof (ephyphen kai ton stêmona) from the same material …, whence (hothen) we must mark out in some such way those who are to hold high office (arxontas) and those who are to hold low offices (tous smikras).” (734e–735a) Athenian Visitor [future office holders = warp and woof]
4. “The best (aristos) purge (katharmos) [i.e. exile or death] is painful (algeinos), like (kathaper) all drastic medicines (hosa tôn pharmakôn).” (735d) Athenian Visitor [purge = all drastic medicines]
5. “A milder (praoteros) form of purge [i.e. emigration (apoikia)] [is used] when owing to scarcity of food … people attack the property of the wealthy … such people the lawgiver regards as a disease (hôs nosêmati) inherent in the city.” (735e–736a) Athenian Visitor [such people = an inherent disease]
The first five similes surround “the prelude of our laws” (734e, to prooimion tôn nomôn), with a pun on the double sense of nomos (law and musical nome or tune): “after the prelude must necessarily follow the tune (anangkaîon pou vomon hepesthai).” Then five more similes (6–10) help to clarify the establishment of the model constitution (paradeigma ge politeias, 739e) and the apportioning of land.
6. “Just as when (hoîon) there is a confluence of floods from many sources—some from springs, some from torrents—into a single pool, we take diligent precaution to insure the purity of the water by drawing it off in some cases, and in others by making channels to divert its course—for the present (pros to paron) we do not need to contrive either a form of emigration or any other purgative selection drawing off water or making channels.” (736a–b) Athenian Visitor [emigration or any purge = drawing off water or making channels]
7. “[The rule of moderation (tês metriotêtos)] is the main foundation for the security of the state (sôtêrias archê megistê poleôs) and on this as on a firm keel (hoîon krêpidos monimou) it is possible to build a civic organization (kosmon politikon).” (736e) Athenian Visitor [rule of moderation = a firm keel]
8. “Let this [renouncing avarice by the aid of justice (mê philochrêmateîn meta dikês)] stand fixed for us now as a kind of pillar of the state (hoîon herma poleôs)” (737a) Athenian Visitor [renouncing avarice = a pillar of the state]
9. “The next move (hê dê to meta toûto phora, i.e. the choice of politics, at 739b) might at first cause surprise (thaumasai), like (kathaper) the move of a draughts-player who quits his ‘sacred line’ (pettôn aph’ hieroû).” (739a) Athenian Visitor [next move (political) = move of a draughts-player]
10. “Let the man who receives his portion [(ho lachôn) 1/5040th] tend [therapeuein deî] the land, which is his fatherland, more diligently than (meizonôs ê) a mother tends her children (mêtera paîdas)” (740a) Athenian Visitor [the owner > the land/fatherland = a mother > her children]
11. “The lawgiver (nomothetês) will set the dwellings in the center and around the circumference—almost as if he were telling dreams (pantêi schedon hoîon eneipata legôn) or moulding (ê plattôn), so to say (kathaper), a city and citizens out of wax (ek kêrou tina polin dai politas).” (746a–b) Athenian Visitor [setting dwellings = telling dreams or moulding city and citizens from wax] I.e. such citizens give no more resistance to the planner than wax gives to an artisan.
Laws VI (751–785) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato X]
Officials and legislation.
Two sections contain analogies as interesting alternatives to similes (765e and 769c):
765e consists of an observation about plants that is intended to serve as a parallel for mankind: the importance of the first sprout to the development of the mature plant; thus the importance of early education (“for the first shoot of every plant [shows how the mature plant will develop]”).
769c contains another such parallel example: “We may use this … to illustrate the following point: suppose that a man should propose (to toionde, hôs ei pote tis epinoêseie) to paint a very beautiful creature (zôon) … that would never grow worse but always better; since the painter is mortal, unless he leaves a successor to repair and improve the painting, his toil will be short-lived… The purpose of the lawgiver is similar.” Because of the absence of prothesis, tenor and vehicle, we should call these analogies.
1. “It is not easy to realize that a city-state (polis) should be mixed like a bowl of wine (eînai deî dikên kratêros kekramenên), where when the wine is first poured in, it foams madly, but as soon as it is chastened by the sober deity of water, it forms a fair alliance and produces a potion that is good and moderate. That this is precisely what happens in the blending of children is something which hardly anyone is able to perceive.” (773d) Athenian Visitor [city-state = a bowl of mixed wine]
2. “Some people place no trust at all in the class of servants, but treat them like animals (kata thêriôn physin) with goads and whips …” (777a) Athenian Visitor [them (slaves) = animals]
3. “They (the citizens) will believe that their safety is ensured if they are fenced in by walls and go to sleep like men born to shirk toil (hôs epi to mê poneîn gegonotas].” (779a) Athenian Visitor [they = men born to shirk toil]
Laws VII (788–824) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato XI]
Nurture and education in the ideal city-state.
The Athenian Visitor continues to speak with Clinias (Kleinias) and Megillus.
1. “Shall we lay down a law that … the developing child (to genomen) shall be molded like (hoîon) wax (kêrinon)?” (789e) Athenian Visitor [developing child = wax]
Notice the similes incorporated into the adjectives in the following phrase: “the womanish and servile habits of nurses (gynaikeîa te kai douleia êthê trophôn).” (790a) Athenian Visitor [adjectival similes: like a woman and like a slave]
2. “Thus they (mothers) literally (atechnôs hoîon) cast a spell upon (katauloûsi tôn paidiôn) the children like (kathaperei) the victims of Bacchic frenzy (tôn ekphronôn Bakcheiôn) by employing the combined movements of dance and song.” (790e) Athenian Visitor [children = victims of Bacchic frenzy] The metaphor ‘cast a spell’ (or rather, “play the aula or flute upon”) is preceded by a phrase often associated with similes (atechnôs hoîon, ‘truly as it were’).
3–4. “These [regulations (agrapha nomima, ‘unwritten laws’ (793a)] are just the same as ‘ancestral customs’ (patrious nomous); though not laws (nomoi), they act as (eisi) bonds (desmoi) in every constitution (politeias), forming a link between all its laws both written and unwritten, exactly like (atechnôs hoîon) ancestral customs of great antiquity (archaîa nomima).” (793b) Athenian Visitor [unwritten laws = bonds (= ancestral customs)] Predicate simile followed by a conventional simile.
5. “If they (the bonds) perversely go aside from the right way, like builders’ props (hoîon tektonôn en oikodomêmasin ereismata) that collapse under the middle of the house, they bring everything else tumbling down along with them, one thing buried under another, first the props themselves and then the fair superstructure, once the ancient supports have fallen down.” (793c) Athenian Visitor [the bonds = builders’ props]
6. “Due to the folly of nurses and mothers we have become like lame people (hoîon chôloi), so to say, in our hands.” (794e) Athenian Visitor [we = lame people]
I.e. by nature we should be able to use both hands equally well but we become deficient from poor training.
7. “Just as (kathaper) [a man] who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way … will question himself … or others … and refuses to proceed until he has made sure by investigation of the right direction, we must now do likewise (hêmîn hôsautôs) about the laws (peri nomôn).” (799c–d) Athenian Visitor [we = a man who has come to a crossroads]
8–9. “Just as a shipwright (hoîon dê tis naupêgos) at the commencement of a building outlines the shape of his vessel by laying down her keel, so I appear to be doing the same thing (tauton dê moi kagô)—trying to frame the shapes of lives according to the modes of their souls, and thus literally (ontôs) laying down their keels … to navigate our [barque of] life through this voyage of existence (ton bion arista dia toû ploû toutou tês zôês)” (803a) Athenian Visitor [I = a shipwright; life = a voyage] Here the simile introduces a metaphor with two genitive similes (only the latter is in the Greek).
10. “At daylight children should return to their teachers, for [just as] no (oute) sheep (probata) or other grazing beast ought to exist without a herdsman, [so] nor can (oude) children live without some tutors nor (oude) slaves without masters. Of all wild creatures (thêriôn) the child is the most difficult to manage (dysmetacheiristotaton).” (808d) Athenian Visitor [children > tutors = sheep > herdsman] Thus with the addition of prothetic words (hôsper and houtôs), the analogy becomes a simile.
11. “The child must be strapped up (deî desmeuein), as it were, with many bridles (hoîon chalinoîs tisi), treating him as a freeborn child; … on the other hand, he must be treated as a slave (hôs d’aû doûlon).” (808e) Athenian Visitor [child = a slave] A second simile is implied here by the phrase ‘strapped up, as it were, with many bridles’, suggesting a comparison between a child and a horse.
12. “It appeared to me that they (our discourses, logoi) were framed exactly [like] a poem (pantapasi poiêsei tini prosomoiôs eirêsthai).” (811c) Athenian Visitor [our discourse = a poem] I.e. our discourses were most moderate (metriôtatoi) and suitable (prosêkontes) for young people to hear.
13. “If an invading army should force a battle around the city, it would be a sore disgrace to the State if its women (tas gynaîkas) were … not willing to do as mother-birds (hôsper ornithas), which fight the strongest beasts in defense of their broods (peri teknôn).” (814b) Athenian Visitor [women = mother-birds]
14. “Shall we not lay [these subjects] down as necessary subjects of instruction (tôn deontôn mathêmatôn)? And yet we ought to lay them down provisionally—like pledges capable of redemption (kathaper enechura lysima)—apart from the rest of our constitution.” (820e) Athenian Visitor [these subjects = pledges] ‘These subjects’ are the problems concerning the essential nature of the commensurable and the incommensurable.
Laws VIII (828–850) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato XI]
Laws about festivals, agriculture, and feasts.
Athenian Visitor speaking to Clinias (Kleinias) and Megillus.
1. “He that is in love with the body and hungering after its bloom (tes hôras), as it were that of a ripening peach (kathaper opôras), urges himself to take his fill of it …” (837c) Athenian Visitor [the body’s bloom = a ripening peach]
Cf. Symposium 183d: “As soon as the bloom of the body he so loved begins to fade (hama gar tôi toû sômatos anthei lêgonti), he ‘flutters off and is gone’.” Here the ‘he’ refers to the wicked popular lover who craves the body rather than the soul; the quotation refers to Agamemnon’s remark about his dream in Homer’s Iliad 2.71.
2. “I say that our regulations must proclaim … that our citizens must not be worse than birds (cheirous … ornithôn) and many animals (thêriôn) … which live chaste and celibate lives.” (840d) Athenian Visitor [our citizens ≠ birds and many animals] And again, “And surely our citizens should at least be better than these animals (thêriôn ameinous). (840e) [our citizens = these animals]
Laws IX (853–882) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato XI]
Judicial proceedings.
1. “[We may dread] lest any of our citizens (tis … tôn politôn) should prove horny-hearted (hoîon kerasbolos = ‘hard-shelled’ seed struck by a beast’s horns and therefore unfit for cooking [201n1]) … and just as those ‘horn-struck’ beans (kathaper ekeîna ta spermata) cannot be softened by fire … so these (hoûtoi) should be uninfluenced by laws.” (853c–d) Athenian Visitor [our citizens NOT influenced by law = horn-struck beans NOT influenced by fire] Note the adjectival simile embedded in horny-hearted (hoîon kerasbolos) = a heart like horn.
2. “It was not a bad comparison (apêikasamen) we made [starting at 720a ff.] when we compared (apêikazomen) all those who now make laws for themselves (nomothetoumenous) to slaves as it were being treated by slaves (doulois hôs iatreuomenois hypo doulôn)” (857c) Athenian Visitor [people who make laws for themselves = slaves who doctor themselves]
3. “It is possible for us (hêmîn) to do as bricklayers (kathaper … lithologois) or men starting on any other kind of construction, to collect material piecemeal … at our leisure.” (858b) Clinias (Nota Bene: ≠ the Athenian Visitor) [us = bricklayers]
4–5. “Are we to think about the laws (peri nomôn) for our states (polesi) that they [= the laws] should be in written form (graphês), and that the writings (ta gegrammena) should appear (phainesthai) in the forms (en schêmasi) of a father and mother loving and having concern (noûn)? Or ordering and threatening like (kata) a tyrant or despot (tyrannon kai despotên), who writes [his decrees] on walls and then leaves? (859a) Athenian Visitor [our laws = marriage arrangements ≠ tyrannical decrees]
6. “Is the statement (logos) just made by us [to stand] like a divine oracle (hôsper para theoû lechtheis) … giving no reasoning (logon)? This is impossible.” (861b) Athenian Visitor [Our statement ≠ a divine oracle]
7. “Unjust injuries (blabas) and gains (kerdê) … which are curable (iata) … we must cure, as diseases of the soul (hôs ousôn en psychêi nosôn).” (862c) Athenian Visitor [unjust injuries and gains = diseases of the soul]
Laws X (884–910) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato XI]
Causes of violence; the existence of gods, the soul.
1. “If it were necessary (ei kathaper) for the three of us, as it were, to cross a river flowing swiftly and I, being youngest and most experienced in currents, were to suggest that I make the attempt first to see if the river be fordable … (e) so too now the argument about to begin (ho mellôn logos) is too violent and perhaps even impassable for you.” (892d–e) Athenian Visitor [argument = a fast-flowing river] The difficult argument (logos) is the one proving that the soul is prior to the body (proteron on psychên sômatos; see 893a).
2. “Let us not make our answer by looking directly, as it were (hoîon), at the sun, bringing on night at midday, as though (hôs) looking at reason (noûn) with mortal eyes we could ever (pote) know it sufficiently; … looking at an image (eikona) of the question being asked is a safer way to see.” (897d) Athenian Visitor [looking at reason with mortal eyes = looking directly at the sun] Cf. Republic 7.515c–516b, where Socrates discusses the difficulty that people in the Cave have when they go outside and are dazzled by the bright sunlight of reality. They could not look at things directly. They first would discern in water and shadows the likenesses (eidôla) of men and other things. Similes thus may serve as aids to the truth.
3. “We could never appear to be unskilled creators (phaûloi dêmiourgoi) of fair images (or similes? kalôn eikonôn) in speech, if we described [the two motions] as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot … reason (logon) and the motion (kinêsin) that spins in one place, likened to (apeikasmena) the spinning (phoraîs) of a turned globe (sphairas entornou).” (898a–b) Athenian Visitor [reason = a spinning globe]
4. “This soul (psychên), whether it brings light (phôs) to us all by riding in the chariot of the sun or from outside … every man (panta andra) must regard (hêgeîsthai chreôn) [as] a god (theon).” (899a) Athenian Visitor [the soul = a god]
5. “He who is careless and idle would be in our eyes what the poet [Hesiod Works and Days 303] described as “a man most like (eikelon) ‘stingless drones’ (kêphêsi kothouroisi).” (901a) Athenian Visitor [idle men = stingless drones]
6. “To which kind of rulers will you compare (prosphereîs) them [gods who would accept bribes or be won over by wrongdoers]? Or which are like them (apeikastheien)? Racing drivers or pilots of ships? Or perhaps they might be compared to (an apeikastheîen) rulers of armies (stratopedôn archousi)… or they would seem to be doctors (iatroîs eoikenai) or farmers … (905e) Athenian Visitor [gods = racers or pilots or rulers or doctors or farmers]
7. “We say (phamen d’eînai pou) that the forementioned sin (hamartêma) of greed (pleonexia) [in souls] is called (kaloumenon) disease (nosêma) in bodies, in seasons and years plague, and in cities and states by a change of figure of speech (rhêmati meteschêmatismenon) is called injustice.” (906c) Athenian Visitor [greediness in souls = disease in bodies = plague in seasons = injustice in the state]
8. “It is necessary for one making this argument to say that the gods are indulgent to (syggnômones) unjust men, if one gives them some of their unjust [earnings]—as though (kathaper) wolves (lykoi) should distribute some of their prey to the [guard] dogs (kysi) by bribing them with gifts in order to seize the sheep.” (906d) Athenian Visitor [gods > unjust men = guard dogs > wolves]
Cf. Sophist 3 (231a): “For a wolf is similar to a dog, the wildest [of animals to] the mildest.
9. “Comparing (apeikazôn) the gods to guardians similar to (homoious) any (tisin) of the aforementioned, what man would not be ridiculous? (906d) … You would be making a terrible comparison (deinên gar eikona).” (906e) Athenian Visitor [gods ≠ disgraceful guardians (a terrible comparison)]
Three of the last four similes of this book are devoted to describing the gods.
Laws XI (913–938) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato XI]
Laws for business transactions, wills, orphans.
1. “The laws (tous nomous) … like (dikên) no mean archer (toxotou mê kakou) must aim at the [fitting] amount of punishment.” (934b) Athenian Visitor [the laws = a good archer] Cf. Book 4[1] (above). Law as an archer is the same in both passages (the only instance of such a repetition in Plato’s similes), although the archers’ goals are different.
2. “The lawgiver (nomothetês) like (kathaper) a painter (or draughtsman, zôgraphon) must sketch (hypographein) the actions that follow the code.” (934c) Athenian Visitor [lawgiver = painter]
3. “Although there are many good [things] (pollôn ontôn kai kalôn) in the life of mortals, to most of them there cling (epipephykasin), as it were, cankers (hoîon kêres) which poison and corrupt them. (937d) Athenian Visitor [that which poisons and corrupts the good (things) in life = cankers]
Laws XII (941–969) R. G. Bury, LCL 1967 (1926) [Plato XI]
Military and funerary laws.
1–2. “(There are four types of guest-friends [xenoi] whom the lawgiver must mention:) the first [is the one who comes in the summer] just like (kathaper) the migratory birds … Most of them cross the sea just as if (atechnôs hoîon) they had wings (petomenoi), and for the sake of making money fly over to other cities during the summer season.” (952d–e) Athenian Visitor [first guests of the summer = migratory birds; they [the first group] cross the sea [sailing] = they (migratory bird) arrive (flying)]
3. “In what way shall our city-state (polis) be likened to (homoôthêsetai) the head and senses (kephalêi te kai aisthêsêsin) of a wise man? [Athenian Visitor] … “It is clear that since the city-state (tes poleôs) is the skull (toû kytous), the younger of the guards … have [eyes] to see … and the elders, likened to the mind (apêikasmenous tôi nôi), give advice …” (964d–965a) Athenian Visitor [city-state = head of a wise man: city = skull; guards = eyes; elders = mind]
Lovers (St I.132a–139a) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1964 (1927) [Plato XII]
Rival lovers (erastai) quarrel about philosophy.
1. “Perhaps we feel shame just as (hôsper) Homer said the suitors [felt], not deeming it right that there is someone else who will string the bow.” (135a) Socrates, mocking the boys (prospaizôn) [we = the suitors (Odyssey 21.286)] This refers to the question of whom to ask about moderation in planting studies in the soul (versus exercises in the body).
Lamb (311) thinks that because of the last clumsy section the whole piece may be that of a skillful imitator, successful in the dramatic narrative but not with Plato’s ability in logical development.
(133a) Again, according to this Dialogue which is perhaps post-Platonic, Socrates was strongly affected by handsome men: “I then was staggered (exeplagên), as I always am by young handsome men. It seemed that my young friend too was in as great a flutter (agôniân) as myself.”
(134b) Note also the reference to the saying “even a pig would know that” (toûto kai hyn gnônai): “I thought even a pig—as the saying goes (to legomenon)—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, careworn frame!” (the philogymnastic lover speaking, to the laughter of the other boys) Other references may be found at Laches 196d–e and Theaetetus 166c–d.
Lysis (St II.203a–223b) = W. R. M. Lamb LCL 1953 (1925) [Plato V (III)]
On friendship.
1. “Let us not go in this direction any longer, for the examination seems somewhat difficult like (hôsper) a road.” (213e) Socrates [examination = road]
2. “I think we should go back to the point where we turned aside (etrapêmen)—and be guided by the poets. For the poets are, as it were (hôsper), our fathers in wisdom (pateres tês sophias) and guides. (213e–214a) Socrates [poets = our fathers in wisdom and guides]
3. “I was overjoyed, like some hunter (hôsper thêreutês tis) to have caught what I had hunted (ethêreuomên).” (218c) Socrates [I = a hunter] Momentary satisfaction before another thought occurs to him.
4. “I’m afraid that we have fallen upon some such arguments (logoîs toîs toioutois) regarding friend[ship] as (hôsper) braggart men (anthriopois alazosi).” (218d) Socrates [arguments (logois) = braggart men]
5. “Like clever speakers (hôsper hoi sophoi) in the courtroom I must (deomai) enumerate again all the things that have been said.” (222e) Socrates [I/Socrates = a clever speaker in a courtroom]
6. “Then like some kind of [evil] spirits (hôsper daimones tines) the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis appeared and called them to go home.” (223a) Socrates [tutors = daimones] Cf. Symposium 183c: “Fathers put tutors in charge [of their boys] when they are beloved, to prevent them from conversing with their lovers.” The Dialogue ends in aporia, the participants not having discovered what a friend is (ho ti estin ho philos, 223b, the last sentence).
Menexenus (St II.234a–249e) = R. G. Bury, LCL 1975 (1929) [Plato IX]
Socrates recites Aspasia’s funeral speech (epitaphios logos).
Like Phaedrus, the Menexenus contains a speech composed by a famous instructor (didaskalos) reported by someone else. [3]
1. “After this she [earth] bestowed upon our ancestors birth of olive, balm of labors (ponôn arôgên).” (238a) Socrates quoting Diotima [olive = a balm for labors] An appositional simile with the poetic word arôgê for a protection against disease.
It is perhaps surprising not to find more similes in this rhetorical work with its exaggerated eulogy of autochthony (237b) and pious mother earth (237c) who produces grain and olive as nourishments (238a–c)—but it must be noted that the other extant funeral speeches (epitaphioi) do not have numerous similes either. (See Appendix V 5.) There is a rather dry review of the Athenian mythical and historical tradition (239a–b), Marathon and Salamis (240e–241), Plateia and later (242). There are several comparisons that could have been similes: (e.g. 235c) “When I hear these patriotic orators I imagine that I am living on the Isles of the Blessed;” or trite similes: “our polis is the handmaiden of the weak” (244d); or 247b: “In their parents’ honors the children possess a noble and splendid treasure (kalos thêsauros).” By listing some events (245e) that occurred after the speaker’s death (such as the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6 BC) perhaps Plato is intentionally parodying what Bury called (Introduction, 330) the most glaring defect of contemporary oratory, “its indifference to truth.” On the one hand, he avoids obvious rhetorical forms like similes and metaphors; on the other hand, he adds to that most hackneyed of comparisons (the city as “our mother,” 237e) by stating that the city is not only our mother, but also father (to the sons), son and heir (to the fallen), and guardian (to their parents) (See 249a–c). He does this without using the formulae of similes but by prosaic phrases such as “[the city] standing in the role of father” (en patros schêmati katastâsa, 249a) and “in the position of heir and son etc.” (en klêronomou kai hyeos moirai, en patros … en epitropou, 249b–c) in contrast to the funeral oration attributed to Pericles, who had famously compared the lost soldiers to the spring taken from the year. (See “Aristotle” above, Introduction, Section A 1.)
This is the only Dialogue that does not have a philosophical aspect, and it is not apparent what Plato’s purpose was in composing it. [4] The frame portion (e.g. 235c6) makes clear Socrates’ fondness for mocking the orators (Menexenos: “You are always mocking [prospaizeis] the rhetoricians, Socrates”), so the various examples of alliteration, often a sign of light-heartedness or humor in Plato, would add to this impression. For more discussion see Appendix V 5.
Meno (St II.70a–100c) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1977 (1924) [Plato II]
On virtue (aretê).
1. “I seem to be very lucky, Meno, if in seeking one virtue I have discovered (anêurêka) a swarm (smênos) of virtues (aretôn) lying beside you. (72a) … Now to follow this figure (eikona) of a swarm, suppose I should ask you what is the real nature of a bee (melittês)?” (72b–c) Socrates [virtue = a bee]
The comparison of bees and virtues continues through 72b–c. The word eikona here means something general like figure, image, comparison, or specifically a simile (or metaphor). See below (Republic 5.450a) for ‘swarm of arguments’ and Introduction C.6.2.
2. “[Socrates, I have heard that] you yourself are confused (aporeis) and you make others confused (aporein). And now, it seems to me, you are bewitching (goêteueis) and charming (kai pharmatteis) me and actually casting spells (kai atechnôs katepaideis) so that I am full of confusion (meston aporias). If I may jest (skôpsai),] you seem to me to be in appearance (eidos) and other respects most like (homoiotatos) a flat torpedo sea-fish [sting ray] (tautêi têi plateiai napkêi têi thalattiai)… For really I am numb (narkô) in my soul and tongue and I cannot answer you.” (Meno 80a–b) Meno [you/Socrates = a torpedo fish]
Meno does not actually indicate how Socrates’ appearance (eidos) is like that of a torpedo sea-fish (perhaps an allusion to his snub-nosed face?); he comments only on the effect of being ‘stung’ by Socrates. Further along in this passage (80c3–6) Socrates refuses to be drawn into what Marsh McCall calls “the popular Athenian game of eikazein-anteikazein, in which one party asks, ‘Do you know what someone is very much like?’ and then supplies his own answer, to which the second party makes a comparison in reply. Socrates refers openly here to this Athenian pastime in his final sentence: One thing I know about all handsome people is this—they delight in being compared to something [chairousin eikazomenoi] … since fine features, I suppose, must have fine similes [kalai gar oimai tôn kalôn kai hai eikones]. But I am not playing your game [ouk anteikasomai se].” [5]
At 84b this simile appears again: … “In making him confused and dizzy (narkan) like a sting-ray (hôsper hê narkê), surely we did not harm him?” (Socrates) “I don’t think so.” (Meno) … Didn’t we benefit him by making him confused (narkêsas)?” (Soc.) “I think so.” (84c) (Meno). (The benefit consisted of causing the slave boy to want to know what he did not know.)
3. “And now these opinions (doxai) have just been stirred up in him, like a dream (hôsper onar).” (85c) Socrates [opinions = a dream]
4. “To possess one of the images of Daedalus (ta Daidalou agalmata, 97d)—one of his works which is let loose (tôn poiêmatôn lelumenon)—is of little value, just like a runaway slave (hôsper drapetên anthrôpon, 97e). Socrates [an image of Daedalus = a runaway slave]
At 97d–98 Socrates tells Meno why knowledge (epistêmê) should always be more prized than right opinion (orthê doxê): “If a man knew the way to Larisa … and walked there and led others, would he not lead correctly? (97a) … What if someone had a correct opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, could he not also lead correctly?” (97b) “You have not carefully observed the images of Daedalus; perhaps there are none in your country.” (Socrates) “What do you mean?” (Meno) “That if they are not tied down, they run away and escape; but, if fastened, they stay where they are.” (Socrates) (97e) “It is not worth much to possess one of his works which is set free; it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave: but when tied down it is worth a great deal, for his productions are very fine things. And to what am I referring in saying this? I am referring to true opinions (doxai hai alêtheîs). For these, so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession, [98a] and achieve good things; but they do not stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one ties them down with logic. And this process … is recollection (anamnêsis) … When they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are lasting (monimoi). And this is why knowledge is more valuable than right opinion: knowledge (epistêmê) is superior to right opinion (orthês doxês) because of its bond. (97d–98) Socrates [true opinions = the images of Daedalus = a runaway slave] [recollection = tying true opinion down with logic]
Minos (St II.313a–321d) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1964 (1927) [Plato v. XII]
On law (nomos).
1. “So these [Cretans, the people of Minos and Rhadamanthus] have shown themselves the best law-givers among men of ancient times, apportioners (nomês) and shepherds of men (poimenes andrôn), just as (hôsper) Homer said that the good general (ton agathon stratêgon) was (einai) a ‘shepherd of the people’ (poimena laôn, 321c). Socrates [good general = a shepherd]
Parmenides (St III.126a–166c) = H. N. Fowler, LCL 1977 (1926) [Plato IV]
On Forms (eidê).
Cephalus relates a dialogue told to him by Antiphon, who had heard if from Pythodorus.
1. “And yet just like (hôsper ge) Lacanian hounds (hai Lakainoi skylakes) you [Socrates] chase and track the things that have been said.” (128c) Zeno [you/Socrates = a Lacanian hound]
2. At 131b Socrates objects to Parmenides’ statement that ‘the whole idea’ (holon to eidos, 131a) might be separate from itself when it is in many separate individuals by suggesting that “it might be like day (hoîon hêmera) which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself, so each idea (hekaston tôn eidôn), though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.” (131b) Socrates [the idea/eidos = (hoîon) day] The problem here, as Parmenides points out, is that the ideas are divisible into parts and the one is divided, to which Socrates objects.
3. “You make one to be in many places at once just as if (hoîon ei) you should spread a sail over many persons and then say it was one and all of it was over many.” (131b) Parmenides [make one to be in many places at once = spread a sail over many persons]
4. “[It seems most likely that] these ideas [eidê, forms] exist in nature like patterns (hôsper paradeigmata).” (132d) Socrates [forms (in our souls) = patterns in nature]
NB the sequel to 132d: “If anything resembles (eoike) the idea, can that idea (eîdos) avoid being like the thing which resembles it (mê homoion eînai tôi eikasthenti) in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it? (kath’ hoson autôi aphômoiôthê) Or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?” The language of simile is applied to the complex philosophical problem of this Dialogue.
5. “And yet I seem to have suffered the [fate] of the Ibykeian horse (hippou) a race-horse (athlêtêi) but rather old … to which (hôi) he [Ibycus] compared himself (heauton apeikazôn) … Now I too seem to dread when I remember what a sea of words I have to swim though at my age (dianeûsai tosoûton pelagos logôn).” (137a) Parmenides [I/Parmenides = the Ibykeian horse] This reference to the horse in Ibycus (frg. 2 Bergk) that entered a chariot race and was trembling with fear because he knew what was coming from experience reflects Parmenides’ reluctant agreement to comply with Socrates’ request (136d) to explain his method of training (ho tropos tês gymnasias, 135d).
This ‘mixed metaphor’ of a horse-racing simile and swimming metaphor is embedded in the complex narrative structure of this Dialogue, in which Parmenides’ words are reported by Pythodorus to the elderly Antiphon, who repeats it to Cephalus, the narrator of the Parmenides. The analogy of logos as something that must be swum through occurs again at Phaedrus 264a, where Socrates says that Lysias does not begin at the beginning, but tries “to swim on his back up the current of his discourse from its end and begins with what the lover would say at the end to his beloved.”
6. “Just as (hoîon) things in a picture (eskiagraphêmena) when viewed from a distance (apostanti) … appear to be alike (homoia) … but when you come close, they appear to be many and different (anoimoia).” Therefore other things must appear to be like and unlike …” (165c–d) Parmenides [other things must appear to be like and unlike = things in a picture when viewed from a distance, appear to be alike (homoious) and different (anomoious)] Parmenides’ analogy/simile contradicts young Socrates’ statement at 127e that “the unlike (anomoia) cannot be like (homoia) nor the like (homoia) unlike (anomoia).”
This Dialogue comes to a sudden conclusion after the long and complex discussion of the existence and non-existence of ‘the one’. It is surprising that in the second part of the Dialogue (137c and following: the complex argument of Parmenides) there is only one clarifying simile near the end. Perhaps it is because Socrates is not the interlocutor. The last time the speaker (Parmenides) and respondent (Aristoteles) are named is at 137c, thirty pages before the end. After phanai (137c) there are no names and no ‘he said’s, only a succession of words and phrases signifying agreement: nai, panu ge, alêthê, orthôs, deî, etc.
Phaedo (St I.57a–118a ) = H. N. Fowler LCL 1982 (1914) [Plato I]
On the nature of the afterlife. Plato’s last Dialogue to detail Socrates’ final days (following Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito).
1. [“You seem to have a childish fear … “ (Socrates, 77d) “Perhaps there is inside us a child (tis … pais).] Let me try to persuade this [inner child] not to fear death like (hôsper) [the] hobgoblins (mormolukeia)” (77e) Cebes [fear of death = (childish) fear of hobgoblins]
2. “It [the soul] wanders around (planâtai) (and is) confused and dizzy just like (hôsper) [someone] inebriated (methuousa).” (79c) Socrates [soul = a drunk] Socrates uses the same term for the soul “wandering around” as Timaeus employs for a woman’s womb (planômenon) inside the body (Timaeus 31).
3. “When philosophy first takes possession of their soul, completely fastened and welded to the body, it (the soul) is forced to look at reality as though through a cage (hôsper dia eirgmou).” (82e) Socrates [the soul > the body = a prisoner > a cage]
4. “The soul of the philosopher would not think it right that philosophy … should give itself again in bondage to pleasures and pains and engage in some futile task (anênuton ergon) of Penelope (Pênolopês) unweaving the web she wove.” (84a) Socrates [philosopher > pleasure/pain ≠ Penelope > woven web] The fact that both ‘philosopher’ and ‘Penelope’ are in the genitive case strengthens the similetic comparison.
5. “And as it appears, I seem to you to be worse (phauloteros) at prophecy than the swans (tôn kyknôn), who when they perceive that they must die … then indeed sing most beautifully.” (84e) Socrates [I/Socrates = a prophet worse than swans]
Socrates continues this theme in a long passage about swans by contradicting most people who think they sing in sorrow for their own death whereas they really are rejoicing in their prophetic vision as Apollo’s birds. “I think I am a fellow servant (homodoulos) of the swans” (85b).
6. “Socrates …we accept the notion that the soul is a mixture and harmony (krâsin eînai kai harmonian) of these same elements [heat and cold etc.] … if then the soul is really a kind of (tis) harmony (oûsa harmonia tis) … then [it will perish like other harmonies when the instrument that produces it perishes].” (86c) Simmias [soul > the body = a kind of harmony > a lyre]
Later (88d) Echecrates says that he had always liked the doctrine (logos) that the soul was a kind of harmony (to harmonian tina hêmôn einai tên psychên).
7. “I too like Simmias need (deomai) some ‘figure’ (eikonos tinos = a simile or analogy), as it appears. It seems to me this could be said equally well (homoiôs legesthai), just as (hôsper) someone might say about an elderly weaver (peri anthrôpou hyphantou presbytou) who had died that he was still alive somewhere, offering as proof the cloak that he had woven was still whole and had not perished (87b–c) … and I think the same figure (eikona) would apply to the soul and the body.” (87d) Cebes [the soul > the body = weaver > his cloak] In the ensuing discussion Cebes rejects this comparison.
8. “If you think what I say is true, agree to it … [or] oppose me … so that I may not deceive us both and go away, like a bee (hôsper melitta) leaving my sting (to kentron) sticking in you” (91c) Socrates [Socrates > what he says = a bee > sting)
In 91d Socrates summarizes Simmias’ and Cebes’ doubts about the immortality of the soul; then at 92a–b rejects the view that harmony is a compound (to harmonian einai syntheton prâgma) and that the soul is a harmony made up of elements strung together [like harpstrings] in the body. (Fowler adds the simile.) “For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be” (92b: ou gar dê harmonia ge soi toioûton estin ho apeikazeis). Harmony is the last to be composed and the first to perish.
9. “The soul’s entrance into the human body was the beginning of its dissolution, a disease, as it were (hôsper nosos). (95d) Socrates [the entrance of the soul into the body = a disease]
Most of the first nine similes (2–4, 6–9) are devoted to the soul: as someone drunk, a prisoner, a kind of harmony (soul > the body = harmony > a lyre), a weaver (soul > the body = a weaver > his cloak), a disease. Fourteen through nineteen describe the earth.
10 and11. “Most people, [when they speak so confusingly], seem to be feeling around in the dark (psêlaphôntes), as it were (hôsper) and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. Thus one person surrounds the earth with a vortex, and someone else places air as a support [for the earth] as though (hôsper) on a flat trough. (99b) Socrates [loose logic = groping in the dark; air > earth = a flat trough > (a bowl)]
12 and 13. “Arguments (hoi logoi) are like (homoioi) men (anthrôpois): when they, lacking proper knowledge about arguments, believe in an argument but later think that it is false … conclude that all things, including arguments, go up and down like (atechnôs hôsper) the tide in the Euripus (en Euripôi anô kai katô strephetai).” (99b–c) Socrates to Phaedo [arguments = men; all things = the tide in the Euripus]
14. “[I believe] we who live between the Pillars of Heracles and the Phasis [river] dwell in a small part [of the earth] around the sea like (hôsper) ants or frogs around a pond (peri telma myrmêkas ê batrachous).” (109b) Socrates [we/Greeks around > the sea = ants or frogs around > a pond]
15. “If anyone (tis) should come to the top of the air … he could lift his head above it and see things in that upper world, as fishes (hôsper ichthyes) lift their heads out of water and see the things in our world …” (109e) Socrates [anyone = fishes]
16. “The earth (hê gê) itself appears, if someone should look at it from above, like (hôsper) those twelve-patch leather balls (dôdekaskytoi sphaîrai) variegated …” (110b) Socrates [earth = leather ball (in appearance)]
17. “It is divided into patches of various colors (poikilê chrômasin dieilêmmenê) of which the colors which we see here may be regarded as samples (hôsper deigmata) which (hoîa) painters (grapheîs) use.” (110b) Socrates [colors there = samples here]
18. “Some of the streams in the earth pass completely around in a circle, coiling about the earth like serpents (hôsper hoi opheis).” (112e) Socrates [streams = serpents]
19. “The fourth river issues … having a [dark-blue] colour all over like cyanos (chrôma d’ echonta holon hoîon ho kyanos).” (113b) Socrates [colour = cyanos (lapis lazuli)]
20. “We felt he (Socrates) was truly like (atechnôs hôsper) a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives [as] orphans (orphanoi).” (116a) Phaedo [Socrates > us = father > sons; we = orphans]
Phaedrus (St III.227a–279c) = H. N. Fowler, LCL 1928 (1914) [Plato I]
On love and the art of rhetoric.
Many of the similes in this Dialogue describe the soul, the relationship between lovers, and speech writing (24–31).
1–2. “I examine not these things but myself (emauton) to know whether I happen to be (on tyngchanô) some beast (ti thêrion) more complex (polyplokôteron) and wilder (mâllon epitethymmenon) [than] Typhon (Typhônos).” (230a) Socrates [I = some beast = Typhon]
3. “You seem to have found the drug (to pharmakon) to entice me out here. For just as (hôsper) people lead hungry animals (ta peinônta thremmata) around by holding out a branch or some fruit (thallon ê tina karpon) in front of them, so you, holding out speeches (logous) to me thus in books, will no doubt lead me around all of Attica and wherever else you wish.” (230d) Socrates [I/Socrates > a book = a hungry animal > fruit]
4. “The only alternative, I think, is that I have been filled somehow from other sources through my hearing, like a pitcher (dikên angeiou, 235d).” Socrates [I/ Socrates = a pitcher]
5. “As (hôs) wolves (lykoi) love a lamb (arnas) so (hôs) lovers adore a beloved.” (241d) Socrates, quoting a verse of hexameter poetry [a lover > a beloved = a wolf > a lamb]
In contrast to this cynical view of the lover in Socrates’ first speech, in his palinode (244–257b) he presents an idealized picture, with the lover worshiping the god-like face of his loved one like a god (251a: hôs theon sebetai) and treating him like a god (253a: homoiotaton tôi spheterôi theôi and 255a: hôs isotheos). Thus the climax of this description of love is reported in a stream of vivid similes. [the beloved = a god]
6. “Concerning its [the soul’s] form this much may be said. To tell what it really is would require an utterly superhuman (pantêi pantôs theias) and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure (hôi de eoiken). Let it be compared to (eoiketô) the composite power of a winged yoke of horses and a charioteer (symphytôi dynamei hypopterou zeugous te kai hêniochou).” Socrates (246a; more at 253d ff.) [soul = a winged yoke of horses and charioteer]
There follows the long description of the human soul, which we would now call an allegory, although introduced by this simile, which (Socrates says) substitutes for an almost impossible discourse. Hence the value of a good simile!
7. “[The fourth kind of madness is] when [the lover] seeing beauty and feeling his wings growing, longs to stretch them for an upward flight but cannot do so, and … like a bird (ornithos dikên) gazing upward, neglects the things below.” (249d) Socrates [lover = a bird]
8. “Being pure and not buried in this which we carry around and call body, we are imprisoned (dedesmeumenoi) like an oyster (ostreou tropon).” (250c) Socrates [we > (imprisoned in our bodies) = oysters > (in their shells)]
9. “But giving himself up to pleasure like a beast (tetrapodos nomon) he proceeds to fornication and begetting children.” (250d) Socrates [man devoted to pleasure = a beast]
10. “But he who is newly initiated …, when he sees a godlike face or some form of a body which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and … then, as he gazes, he reveres him as a god (hôs theon sebetai) and if he did not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god (thyoi an hôs agalmati kai theôi tois paidikois)” (251a) Socrates [beloved = a god = an idol (agalma)]
A minor simile follows in the next sentence: “And a change (metabolê) takes over him as he looks as though (hoîon) from shivering (ek tês phrikês).”
11. “Now in this process the whole soul throbs and palpates, and whatever pain (hoper to … pathos) those feel around their gums when their teeth begin to grow is the same (tauton dê) that the soul suffers where the growth of feathers begins.” (251b–c) Socrates [pain of the soul with growth of feathers = cutting teeth]
12. “The feather-sprouts … throb like pulsing arteries (hoion ta sphyzonta). (251d) Socrates [feather-sprouts = pulsing arteries]
13. “In addition to revering him who possesses beauty, he finds (hêurêke) [in him] the only healer of his greatest woes (iatron monon).” (252b) Socrates [he who has beauty = the only healer of his woes]
14. “The lover fashions and adorns [his beloved] like a statue (hoion agalma) as though he were his god (hôs theon auton).” (252d) Socrates [beloved = a statue of a god]
15. “Considering the beloved the cause of this, they [lovers] revere him still more, and even pray to (draw inspiration from) Zeus like (hôsper) Bacchants (bakchai). (253a) Socrates [lovers = Bacchants]
16. “The charioteer (ho hêniochos) … falls back like a racer from the starting-rope (hôsper apo hysplêgos anapesôn).” (254e) Socrates [charioteer of the soul = a racer]
17. “Devoting all service [to his beloved] as to a god (hôs isotheos).” (255a) Socrates [beloved = a god]
18. “Then the source of this flow, which Zeus in his passion for Ganymede named desire … like a breath or some echo (hoion pneuma ê tis êchô) … is carried back whence it arose, so the flow of beauty (hôs to tou kallous rheuma) goes back to the beautiful through the eyes …” (255c) Socrates [desire = a breath or an echo]
19–20. “Like (hoîon) one who has caught an eye disease from someone [and] cannot explain it, thus he is aware of seeing himself in his lover’s [eyes] as (hôsper) in a mirror (katoptrôi).” (255d). Socrates [(love) = catching an eye disease (i.e. without contact); seeing oneself in one’s lover’s eyes = seeing oneself in a mirror]
21–23. “Now if they [the singing cicadas (hoi tettiges aidontes)] should see us … not conversing at mid-day but lulled to sleep by their song because of our mental laziness, they would quite justly laugh at us, considering us [to be] (hêgoumenoi) some slaves (andrapod’ atta) coming … to sleep around the fountain at noon like sheep (hôsper probatia). But if they see us conversing and sailing past them like (hôsper) Sirens (Seirênas) unmoved, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which they have from the gods to give to men.” (259a–b) Socrates [us/Socrates and Phaedrus = some slaves; = sheep; the cicadas = Sirens]
24. “But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse (panta logon) must be organized like a living being (hôsper zôion) having a body of its own, as it were (sôma ti echonta), so as not to be headless (akephalon) or footless (apoun), but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.” (264c) Socrates [every discourse = a living being]
25. “You will find that it [Lysias’ speech] is no different from (ouden diapheronta) the inscription (tou epigrammatos) that some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.” (264d) Socrates [Lysias’ speech = an inscription] Socrates explains that, as this inscription can be read in any order, so Lysias’ speech is haphazardly arranged.
26. “[The other principle (eidos) is] dividing things by categories (eidê) where the joints occur naturally (kat’ arthra hêi pephyken), and not trying to hack off any part (katagnynai meros mêden) [of a definition of love] using the manner of a bad butcher (kakoû mageirou tropôi chrômenon).” (265e) Socrates [one ≠ a clumsy butcher]
27. “But they [Sophocles or Euripides] would not, I think, rebuke him harshly (agroikôs … loidorêseian), but [they would behave] as (hôsper) a musician (mousikos) would, if he met a man who thought he understood harmony because he could strike the highest and lowest notes.” (268d) Socrates [Sophocles and Euripides = a musician]
“Sophocles would say that this person knew the preliminaries (ta pro tragôidias) but not the elements (ou ta tragika) of tragedy.” (269a)
28–29. “At any rate, a procedure (methodos) without these [considerations] would be like (eoikoi an hôsper) the progress of a blind man (typhlou poreiai). Yet surely he who pursues any study (technê) scientifically ought not to be comparable (ou mên apeikasteon) to a blind or a deaf man (typhlôi oude kôphôi).” (270d) Socrates [procedure = the progress of a blind man; a student ≠ a blind or deaf man]
30–31. “Writing (graphê), Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very similar to (alêthôs homoion) painting (zôgraphiai) for the creatures of painting (ta ekeinês ekgona) stand like (hôs) living beings (zônta) but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence.” (275d) Socrates [writing = painting; creatures of painting = living beings]
Philebus (St II.11a–67b) = H. N. Fowler, LCL 1917 [Plato VIII]
On pleasure and knowledge.
Specifically, similes 2 and 8–13 are devoted to describing pleasure.
1. “Thus our argument (logos) like (hôsper) a story (myth) would perish.” (14a) Socrates [argument (logos) = a story (mythos)] Socrates persuades Protarchus to agree that forms of knowledge, like pleasures, are many and different.
2. “If you had no memory, you would not know whether you were enjoying your pleasures or not … you would not be able to lead the life of a man but of some mollusc (pleumonos) or other such (hosa) sea creature (thalattia) as a shellfish (ostreinôn). (21b–d) Socrates [life of a man = [life] of a mollusc or shellfish]
3. “It appears [that we will] need (deîn) another contrivance/weapon (allês mêchanês) to advance to the second level in behalf of mind (hyper noû), like (hoîon) arrows (belê) different from those of our previous discussion (toû emprosthen logoû).” (23b) Socrates [weapon = arrows]
4. “All philosophers (hoî sophoi) agree that mind (noûs) is (esti) king (basileus) of heaven and earth (ouranoû te kai gês).” (28c) Socrates [mind = king] Again at 30d Socrates says that “it has long been believed that mind always rules the universe (aei toû pantos noûs archei).” Then he adds, “sometimes a joke (paidia) is a restful change (anapaula) from serious talk (tês spoudês)” (30e).
5. “Our soul then seems (dokei) to resemble some book (hê psychê bibliôi tini proseikenai).” (38e) Socrates [soul = a book: because memory (mnêmê), combined with our senses (aisthêseis) and feelings (pathêmata), almost seems to write words in our souls] Cf. 39b: A painter (zôgraphon) paints pictures (eikonas) in our souls to illustrate the words which the writer has written. (Socrates)
6. “Let us, like athletes (kathaper athlêtai) approach and grapple with this new argument.” (41b) Socrates [us = athletes] i.e. we must prove that false pleasures exist in us (41a).
7. Socrates quotes (47e) Homer’s Iliad (18.109–110), which contains a simile: “[anger] which stirs even a wise man (polyphrona per) to wrath and is much sweeter than honey dripping down (hos te poly glykiô melitos kataleibomenoio) [anger = honey]
8–9. “Moreover we are like (kathaper) wine-pourers (hêmîn oinochoois tisi) standing near [two] fountains (krênai): one of honey (melitos) and the other of pure, healthy water (hydatos). One could compare (apeikazoi) the former to a [fountain] of pleasure (hêdonês), the other to a sober, wineless [fountain] of wisdom (phronêseôs).” (61c) Socrates [we = wine-pourers; two fountains: honey = fountain of pleasure; water = fountain of wisdom]
10. “Do you wish, then, that I, like some doorkeeper (hôsper thyrôros tis) pushed and shoved by a mob, allow all kinds of knowledge (pasas tas epistêmas) to flow in through the open doors?” (62c) Socrates [I/Socrates = a doorkeeper]
11. “But you must consider the true and pure pleasures (hêdonas alêtheis kai katharas) almost our own by nature (oikeias) … and especially all thoses which follow virtue as though handmaids of a god (aretês hoposai kathaper theoû opadoi).” (63e) Socrates [pure pleasures > virtue = handmaids > a god]
12. “Pleasure (hêdonê) is the greatest of impostors (alazonistatôn) … and in the pleasures of love (ta aphrodisia) which are said to be greatest, perjury (to epiorkeîn) is even pardoned by the gods, as if the pleasures were like children (hôs kathaper paidôn tôn hêdonôn) utterly devoid of all sense.” (63e) Protarchus [pleasures = children]
13. “Trusting in them [cows and horses and all the other animals] as augurs (hôsper manteis) [trust in] birds (ornisin), most people judge that pleasures [are the greatest blessings in life]. (67b) Socrates [most people > animals (like cows) = augurs > birds] They think the lusts of beasts are better witnesses than the words inspired by the philosophic muses.
Two proverbs may be cited: Promarchus tells Socrates not to disturb Philebus and ask him a question because it is better “to let sleeping dogs lie” (Fowler’s metaphorical translation, 217, of the phrase mê kineîn eû keimenon at 15c); and Socrates says (16c) that the ‘road’ (hê hodos) of argument is not at all difficult to point out but very difficult to follow” (hên dêlôsai men ou pany chalepon, chrêsthai de pangchalepon).
Protagoras (St I.309a–362a) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1977 (1924) [Plato II]
Sophists and the teachability of virtue.
1. “Protagoras was enchanting [them] with his voice like Orpheus (hôsper Orpheus).” (315a) Socrates [Protagoras = Orpheus] Cf. 316e: “they used their arts [as] outer coverings (parapetasmasin).”
2. “They (the children of Pericles) go around grazing like (hôsper) sacred cattle [to see if they can stumble upon virtue/aretê by themselves].” (aphetoi = cattle ‘let loose’ from work and dedicated to a god) (320a) Socrates [Pericles’ children = sacred cows]
3. “No one punishes [a] wrong-doer(s) [merely] because he did wrong, unless he punishes him unreasonably like a beast (hôsper thêrion) … he thinks virtue is teachable (paideotên einai aretên), therefore he punishes to deter.” (324a–b) Protagoras [wrongdoer = a beast]
4. “(If he does not obey) they treat him (the boy, ho pais) like (hôsper) a bent and twisted piece of wood (xylon).” (325d) Protagoras [the boy = a piece of wood]
5. “Just as (atechnôs hôsper) the writing masters (hoi grammatistai) first draw letters in faint outline with the pen for their less advanced pupils etc… so (hôs) the city sketches out for them the laws devised by good lawgivers of yore …” (326d) Protagoras [the city > laws = writing masters > letters]
N.B. Protagoras’ analogy at 327e: “Everyone is a teacher of arete … just as if (hôsper an ei) you asked ‘Who is a teacher of Greek?’ you wouldn’t find one.”
6–7. “If some question is asked of one of them [public speakers], they are just like (hôsper) books (biblia) and cannot answer or ask questions on their own … but … like (hôsper) brass gongs (ta chalkia plêgenta) when struck ring for a long time …” (329a) Socrates [public speakers = books = brass gongs]
8–9. “Are the parts of virtue like (hôsper) parts of the face (mouth and nose and eyes and ears), or like (hôsper) parts of gold with no differences between the parts except in size?” (329d) Socrates [virtue ? = the face or = gold] Protagoras replies that the parts of virtue (ta tês aretês moria) are like parts of the face (ta toû prosôpou moria).
10. “But now it is just as (hôsper) if you should ask me to keep up with the Himeraian [runner] Kriso in his prime or to race one of the long-distance runners.” (335e) Socrates [I/Socrates ≠ runner Kriso]
“If you want to see us run together, you must ask him to adapt his pace since I cannot run fast but he can run slowly. Thus if you want to have Protagoras and me, ask him to resume the method he used at first—in short sentences and keeping to the point.”
NB the punning way that Alcibiades addresses Callias: “You do not state the matter well (kalôs), Callias (ô Kallia).” Socrates refers to himself in the Apology (39b) as old and slow (bradys ôn kai presbytês), who is caught by death, whereas his accusers could not escape wickedness (ponêria) which runs faster than death (thâtton gar thanatou thei).
11. “For like is related to like by nature, but custom, being (ôn) a tyrant over men, overpowers many things contrary to nature.” (337d) Hippias [custom = a tyrant]
Lamb (179n2) notes Hippias’ “frequent metaphors … designed to display his wide range of knowledge.” He advises Socrates to “loosen the reins to his speeches” (338a) and tells Protagoras not to “let loose your sails” in “the sea of words”; he advises them “to choose an umpire (rhabdouchon, 338a).”
12. “If you choose [an umpire] who is not superior to Protagoras—but you say he is—this too would be shameful for him, as if he were some simple soul (hôsper phaulôi) requiring a supervisor.” (338c) Socrates [Protagoras = some simple soul]
13. “And I at first, just as if (hôsper) having been hit by a good boxer (hypo agathoû pyktou), was blinded and dizzy when he [Protagoras expounding a poem by Simonides] had said this and the others had shouted their approval.” (339e) Socrates [I/Socrates = someone hit by a good boxer]
14. “Then, it seems, I have blundered badly, Protagoras, and I am [eimi tis] some ridiculous physician, trying to cure [but] making the disease greater.” (340d–e) Socrates [I/Socrates = a bad physician]
15. “If he (Simonides) could overthrow (katheloi) this famous saying, as (hôsper) [one might conquer] a famous athlete, … he would win fame for himself.” (343c) Socrates [Simonides > this famous saying = someone > a famous athlete] The ‘famous saying’ was Pittacus’ that “it is hard to be good” (to chalepon esthlon emmenai).
16–17. “All these [five] parts of virtue are not like pieces of gold similar to (homoia) one another and to the whole of which they are parts, but like the parts of the face (ta tou prosôpou moria) … dissimilar (anomia) to each other.” (349c) [6] Socrates Cf. #16–17 above and 330a–b where the comparison includes the clause ‘if it is similar to the analogy’ (eiper tôi paradeigmati ge eoiken) [virtue (≠ gold) = the face]
18. “Just as (hôsper) in examining a man’s health from his appearance (ek tou eidou) … one might say, ‘Come now, uncover (ithi dê moi apokalupson) your chest too … so that I may examine you thoroughly’ … I would like to make a similar examination of you, Protagoras … and say, ‘Come now, uncover (ithi dê moi apokalupsas your inner thoughts (tês dianoias).’” (352a) Socrates [Socrates > Protagoras’ inner self = someone > a physical examination]
19. “Many people think … of knowledge (epistêmês) as a slave (hôsper peri andrapodou) dragged around by all the other [forces].” (352c) Socrates [knowledge = a slave]
20. “Like a practised weigher (hôsper agathos histanai anthrôpos) [you] put pleasant things and painful things in the scale … and tell me which counts for more.” (356b) Socrates [Protagoras evaluating pleasure and pain = a practised ‘weigher’]
The science of weighing (hê metrêtêkê technê) versus the power of appearances (hê tou phainomenou dynamis). “Which is our salvation? Is it not the latter that leads us astray?” (356d)
21. “The outcome of our discussion just now seems to me to accuse and laugh at us like a man (hôsper anthrôpos)” (361a) Socrates [discussion (logos) = a person laughing at us]
Republic I (327–354) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1930) [Plato V]
What is justice (dikaiosynê)?
1. “It seems to me that we should learn from them [the very aged], as it were (hôsper), from travelers (tina hodon proelêluthotôn) who have preceded us on a road on which we too perhaps must eventually go.” (328e) Socrates [the very aged = experienced travelers]
2. “Hush, sir, he [Sophocles] said; most gladly have I escaped this thing (ta aphrodisia, [sexual pleasure]), as if (hôsper) I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master (agrian despotên).” (329c) Cephalus [sexual pleasure = a raging and savage master]
3. “Just as (hôsper) poets love their own poems and fathers their sons, so (tautêi) men who have made money (chrêmatisamenoi) … value their money as their own creation.” (330c) Socrates [money men > money = poets > poems = fathers > sons]
4. “When a man leads his life justly and piously, ‘hope (elpis) accompanies him [as] a sweet nurse of old age (glykeia … gêrotrophos) to cheer his heart.’” (331a) Cephalus quoting Pindar (frg. 214) [hope = sweet nurse of old age]
5. “A kind of thief (kleptês tis), then, as it seems (hôs eoiken), the just man (ho dikaios) has been revealed to be (anapephantai) … Then justice seems to be (hôs eoiken), according to you and Homer and Simonides, a kind of stealing (kleptikê tis).” (334a–b) Socrates to Polemarchus, who admits aporia at 334b: “I no longer know what I meant.” His confusion was no doubt influenced by Socrates’ punning paradox (at the end of 333d) that “justice … is useless (achrêstos) but in its uselessness it is useful (en de achrêstiai chrêsimos).” [justice = stealing; just man = thief] Socrates adds an explanation (334e) that “justice cannot be very valuable (spoudaîon) if it is useful only for things that are useless (ta achrêsta chrêsimon).”
6. “But gathering himself up like (hôsper) a wild beast, he [Thrasymachus] hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces.” (336b) Socrates [Thrasymachus = a wild beast]
7. “We are searching for justice (dikaiosynên), a thing more precious than (timiôteron) much fine gold (pollôn chrysiôn).” (336e) Socrates [justice = much fine gold]
8. “Saying this Thrasymachus intended to depart, like (hôsper) a bathman (balaneus), having poured his long and dense speech all over our ears.” (344d) Socrates [Thrasymachus = a bathman]
Paul Shorey (LCL Republic vol. 1, 71) points out the metaphor in the verb katantleo by citing Republic 536b, Lysis 204d (where Ctesippus jokes about Hippothales “inundating us with his poems about Lysis”) and Aristophanes’ Wasps 483. Socrates changes the metaphor in the next section when he says that Thrasymachus “hurled such an argument (logos) at them before leaving.”
9. Socrates urges Thrasymachus to be consistent in his argument about a true shepherd, whereas Thrasymachus sometimes says that “the shepherd herds his sheep (probata) not with regard for what is best for the sheep, but as if he were a banqueter (hôsper daitymona) … or as a money-maker (hôsper chrêmtistên) with a view to selling them.” (345c) Socrates [shepherd = a banqueter or money-maker]
10. “Either allow me to speak at such length as I desire or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wives telling their tales (hôsper taîs grausi tous mythous legousais), will say, ‘Very good!’ and will not assent and desist.” (350e) Thrasymachus [you/Socrates = an old wife]
11. “With this [I hope] you have feasted well at the Festival of Bendis, Socrates.” “… I have not dined well at all, Thrasymachus, I said, not through your fault but through my own. But like (hôsper) gluttons (lichnoi) who seize and taste [every plate of food] that is passed along before properly enjoying the earlier dish, I also seem to be like that here.” (354b) Socrates [I/Socrates = glutton] Here Socrates continues Thrasymachus’ metaphor of feasting as conversing, adding a simile about gluttons. See also Shorey’s note at 352b (99nd) about the image of the feast of reason: cf. 354a–b, Lysis 211c, Gorgias 522e, Phaedrus 227b and Timaeus 17a.
Republic II (357–383) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1930) [Plato V]
Is justice better than injustice? The polis.
1. “Thrasymachus seems to have been charmed (kêlêthênai) by you [Socrates] like (hôsper) a serpent (ophis), although sooner than necessary.” (358b) Glaucon [you/Socrates > Thrasymachus = charmer > serpent]
2. “How strenuously you [Glaucon] polish off each (ekateron) of your two men for the competition for the prize as if it were (hôsper) a statue (andriata).” (361d) Socrates [prize = a statue] cf. Republic [7–19] (540c).
3. “I think we should employ the method of search (zêtêsin) that we should use if (hoianper) we, with not very keen vision, were asked to read small letters from a distance …” (368d) Socrates [method of search = reading small letters at a distance]
There follows the analogy of studying justice in a city rather than in a person to see better the origin of justice and injustice in a polis.
4. “Do you think that the nature of a well-bred dog (gennaiou skylakos) for guard duty (phylakên) differs from (diapherein) [that] of a well-bred young man (neaniskou eugenous)?” (375a) Socrates [well-bred young man = well-bred dog] The guardians will be like well-bred hounds, gentle to those they know but ferocious to those they do not know (375e).
See Book 5.6 (469d–e) below. In contrast to this picture of the well-bred dog, in Book 5 Socrates suggests a comparison between people who plunder a corpse on the battlefield and dogs who snarl at stones thrown at them but do not attack the one who throws the stones.
5. At 375d Socrates says that “we have lost sight of the comparison (eikonos) that we set before ourselves.” “Let us proceed as if (hôsper) we were telling stories (en mythôi mythologountes) and had ample leisure.” (376d) Socrates [process = telling stories]
6. “Which type of story (mythos) do you blame, Socrates?” (Adeimantos) “The kind you should blame first, especially if the lie is a pretty one (mê kalôs speudêtai) … when one portrays badly (eikazêi tis kakôs) the true nature of the gods, just as (hôsper) a painter (graphôs) whose portraits bear no resemblence to his models.” (377e) Socrates [false portrayer of the gods = bad painter] Painters are the vehicle also in Republic 6.1 and 6.4.
Republic III (386–417) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1930) [Plato V]
Education of the Guardians (n.b. especially similes #4–11); constitution of the polis.
1. “Wherever the argument (logos), like (hôsper) the wind (pneûma), carries [us], there we must go.” (394d) Socrates [argument = the wind]
2. “If we likened (apeikazontes) that kind of food (sitêsin) and regimen (diaitan) to music and song (melopoiiai te kai ôidêi) … it would be a fair comparison (orthôs apeikazoimen).” (404d–e) Socrates [food and regimen = music and song]
3. “To fill ourselves up with with humours and winds like (hôsper) swamps (limnas) … don’t you think that’s disgraceful?” (405d) Socrates [our bodies = swamps]
4–5. “When a man abandons himself to music (mousikêi) and pours into his soul (katachein tês psychês) as it were through the funnel of his ears (dia tôn otôn hôsper dia chônês) these sweet … soft harmonies (harmonias), the first result is that … his high spirit (thymoeides) … is softened like iron (hôsper sidêron emalaxe) … until he dissolves his spirit and cuts out as it were (hôsper) the tendons from his soul …” (411a–b) Socrates [ears = funnels; high spirit = iron]
6. “Such a man (who has had no contact with music) becomes a misologist and stranger to music (misologos kai amousos) … and achieves all his ends (pros panta diaprattetai) like a beast (hôsper thêrion) by violence and savagery.” (411d) Socrates [such a man = beast]
7–8. “Just as (hôsper) men accustom colts (tous pôlous) to noises and uproar to see if they are able to take fright, so (houtô) we must bring these lads while young (neous ontas) into fears … and to pleasures testing [them] (basanizontes) much more carefully than men do gold in the fire (poly mâllon ê chryson en pyri).” (413d) Socrates [men > colts = we > these lads = men > gold]
9–10. “The earth (hê gê) delivered them [the Athenians] being (oûsa = as] a mother (mêtêr) and now they ought to take thought for their land as if (hôs) [it were] their mother and nurse (peri mêtros kai trophou) … and consider the other citizens (tôn allôn politôn) as (hôs) their earth-born brothers (tês chôras adelphôn ontôn kai gêgenôn).” (414e) Socrates [earth = the mother and nurse of the Athenians; other citizens = brothers]
Shorey (LCL Republic II 303ne) cites Menexenus 237e–238a as a parallel for this symbolism, but in that text, purporting to be a patriotic funeral oration, the earth-mother symbolism is stated as a fact without the adornment of simile or any rhetorical flourish.
11. “[The Guardians] must repel [attackers from outside], if some enemy (polemios) like (hôsper) a wolf (lykos) should come against the flock.” (415E) Socrates [outside attackers versus > Athens = wolf versus > a flock of sheep]
Cf. Laws Book 10.8 (906d) for the simile of wolves trying to bribe guard-dogs, cited as an image for the impossible theory that the gods could be bribed by criminals. Another example that brings these two creatures together is the paradoxical simile spoken by the Elean Visitor at Sophist 231a: a wolf is very similar to a dog, the wildest to the mildest [of animals]. See below, Sophist [3] (231a).
12. “It would be most shameful for shepherds to breed dogs … that through hunger or some other evil condition, shall attack the sheep … and be likened to wolves instead of dogs (anti kynôn lykois homoiôthênai).” (416a) Socrates [dogs = wolves]
The image of ‘a wolf in sheep’s clothing’ or the variant ‘foxes guarding the hen-house (or chicken coop)’ may be found in many contexts, from Jesus’ reference to false prophets “who come to you in sheep’s clothing” (Matthew 7:15) to modern political allusions (e.g. bankers regulating Wall Street). See also Aesop’s fables (Perry Index #267, 366, and 451) and the maxim ovem lupi committere.
A cluster of similes in Book 3 [7–11] revolves around the selection and education of guardians.
Republic IV (419–445) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1930) [Plato V]
Justice in the polis.
1. “Our first task then … is to mould (plattomen) [the model of] the happy (tên eudaimona) state … as if (hôsper) we were colouring a statue (hêmâs andrianta graphontas). (420c) Socrates [mould the state = colouring a statue]
2. “For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they can’t see that they are in very truth, as it were, [trying to] cut off a Hydra’s [head] (agnoûntes hoti tôi onti hôsper Hydran temnousin).” (426a) Socrates [enacting and amending such laws = (hôsper) cutting off a Hydra’s head]
3. “If you wish, I can illustrate it [= what sort of things should be feared (429c)] by a similitude (homoion eînai, ethelô apeikasai). (429d) Socrates [moral training of the guardians = dying of selected white wools with fast colors] There follows the analogy of dyers of wool and how they hold the purple hue:
“We had no other purpose than that they [the guardians] should receive our laws like dye [as it were] (tous nomous … hôsper baphên) so that their belief and faith (hê doxa) might be fast-coloured (deusopoios) … (430a) Socrates [our laws = dye]
4a–b. “And so that their dye (baphên) might not be worked out by those dreadful lyes (ta rhymata taûta), pleasure (hê te hêdonê)—more potent than any detergent or abstergent (chalestraiou deinotera oûsa … kai konias)—and pain and fear and desire [more sure] than any lye (pantos allou rhymmatos).” (430a–b) Socrates [pleasure / pain / fear / desire = lyes (detergents)]
5. “Glaucon, it is time for us, like hunters (hôsper kynêgetas), to surround the covert and keep close watch so that justice may not slip through and vanish from our sight.” (432b) Socrates [us = hunters]
Shorey (365nf) comments that the “elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the importance of dikaiosynê and partly to relieve the monotony of continuous argument.”
6. “Why all the time … the thing was tumbling about our feet … and yet we could not see it, but were most ludicrous, like (hôsper) people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands. So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off in the distance, which was perhaps the reason it escaped us.” (432d–e) Socrates [we = people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands]
7. “It may be that by examining them* side by side (par’ allêla skopoûntes) and rubbing them (tribontes) against one another, as it were, from the fire-sticks (hôsper ek pyreiôn) we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth (eklampsai poiêsaimen tên dikaiosynên).” (435a) Socrates [examining them = rubbing with fire-sticks]
*Socrates compares justice in an individual with justice in a city: “Then a just man too will not differ at all (ouden dioisei) from a just city (dikaios ara anêr dikaias poleôs) in respect of the very form of justice (kat’ auto to tês dikaiosynês eîdos), but will be like it (alla homoios estai).” (435a–b)
8–9. “When a man believes himself to be wronged, does his spirit (thymos, 440b) not seethe and grow fierce … and will not let go until it either achieves its purpose or death ends it all, or as a dog is called back by a shepherd (hôsper kyôn hypo nomeôs), it is called back by the reason (hypo tou logou) within and calmed?” (440d) Socrates [spirit called back by reason = a dog called back by a shepherd] “Your similitude is perfect (pany … eoike toutôi hô legeis),” he [Glaucon] said, “and confirms our former statement that the helpers (epikourous) are as it were dogs (hôsper kynas) subject to the rulers (tôn archontôn) who are as it were the shepherds of the city (hôsper poimenôn poleos).” Glaucon [helpers = dogs; rulers = shepherds of the city]
10. The truth, then, as it seems, is that justice is not concerned with the activity outside oneself, but about the interior (443d) … not permitting outside affairs to concern us … but in reality arranging one’s own affairs and ruling over oneself and keeping order and becoming a friend to oneself (philon genomenon heautôi) and harmonizing [the] three parts [(xynarmosanta tria onta) of the soul] like (hôsper) three tones of harmony (orous treis harmonias atechnôs) specifically the low, the high and the middle … and becoming a unit (hena genomenon ek pollôn). (443c–e) Socrates [three parts of the soul = three notes of harmony]
The three parts of the soul are identified (441e) as the rational (to logistikon), high-spirited (to thymoeides), and (442a) appetitive (to epithymêtikon). Note the phrase at the end (443e1, hena ek pollôn) that corresponds to the U.S.A. motto e pluribus unum.
11. “Therefore it [autên = adikia = injustice] must be (deî eînai) a kind of civil war (stasin tina) of these three [principles].” (444b) Socrates [injustice = a kind of civil war]
12. “Virtue (aretê), then, would be a kind of health (hygieia tis aneiê) and beauty (kallos) and good condition of the soul (euexia psychês), and vice (kakia) would be disease (nosos), ugliness (aischos) and weakness (astheneia).” (444d–e) Socrates [virtue = health; vice = disease]
Republic V (449–480) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1930) [Plato V]
Rule of the philosophers; guardians and Forms (idea).
Metaphors abound at the beginning of this book: you are a slacker (aporrhaithymeîn hêmîn dokeîs, 449c) and are trying to cheat us out of a whole division … we have long been lying in wait for you (perimenon, 449d) … ‘set me down too,’ said Glaucon, ‘as voting this ticket (eme … koinônon tês psêphou tautês tithete, 450a)
… ‘Surely,’ said Thrasymachus, ‘you may consider it a joint resolution of us all, Socrates (pâsi taûta dedogmena hêmîn nomize),’ and Socrates’ reply (450a–b): ‘You don’t realize what a swarm of arguments you have stirred up by this demand (ouk iste hoson esmon logôn epegeirete).’ Then Thrasymachus replies, “Do you suppose this company has come here to prospect for gold (literally ‘to smelt ore’) and not listen to discussions (chrysochoêsontas oiei tousde nûn enthade aphîchthai, 450b)?” The introduction ends with a reference to finishing the male drama (meta andreîon drâma) before turning to the female (to gynaikeîon aû perainein, 451c), i.e. Socrates’ discussion of the communion of wives and children among the guardians and the rearing of children between birth and formal schooling. See above at Meno 1, where phrases like ‘swarm of arguments’ are considered similes.
1. “If any false note (plêmmeles) in the argument (toû logou) does us any harm, we release you as (hôsper) in a homicide case (phonou), and warrant you pure (katharon) of hand and no deceiver (apateôna) of us.” (451b) Glaucon to Socrates [the argument = a homicide case] Shorey (432na) comments that hôsper here “marks the legal metaphor.”
With reference to the common training of males and females, Socrates brings up the analogy of watchdogs (tôn phylakôn kynôn, 451d) as guardians of the flock; Shorey’s note (433nc) lists other passages for the use of “analogies drawn from animals cf. 375–376, 422D, 466D, 467B, 491D–E, 537A, 546A–B, 564A.”
“Whether one tumbles into a little pool or into the great sea (to megiston pelagos), one must swim (neî) just the same. Therefore we, too, must swim (neusteon … ek toû logou) and try to save ourselves from the [sea of] argument in the hope that either some dolphin will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue.” (453d) Socrates [argument = the sea] This is a metaphor translated as a simile by the addition of the word ‘sea’. Shorey (440na) cites Protagorus 338a for the pelagos tôn logôn (sea of words).
2. They must strip to exercise “since they will be clothed with virtue instead of cloaks (aretên anti imatiôn amphiesontai).” (457a) Socrates [virtue = a cloak]
NB ‘anti’ as the prothesis here (preposition with the genitive case).
3. “The man who laughs at the idea of women stripped for exercise (epi gymnais gynaixi) is ‘plucking the unripe fruit of laughter (atelê tou geloiou drepôn karpon)’.” (457a) Socrates [laughter = unripe fruit] This is adapted from Pindar, fr. 209 Schroeder, according to Shorey, 457na. Here the vehicle (fruit) is metaphorical (‘unripe’, perhaps because of ‘laughing too soon’).
4. “We may say that we have escaped this one matter [(toûto hen) the regulation of women] like a wave (hôsper kûma) so that we have not been completely overwhelmed (kataklysthênai) …” (Socrates) “You really are escaping no small wave (ou smikron kûma).” (457b–c) Glaucon [difficult topic = a wave]
5. “Permit me to take a holiday (heortasai, a metaphor) just as (hôsper) idle people (hoi argoi) are accustomed to dine on (hestiâsthai) their own thoughts (a metaphor) when they walk alone.” (458a) Socrates [me/Socrates = an idle person dining on his own thoughts]
Socrates’ language becomes metaphorical here as he prepares to meet the difficult arguments about the community of women and children in the new regime. In 457e he refers to the ‘coalition of arguments’ (logôn sysstasin) he must face; his intention of ‘running away’ (apodrasesthai) from one of the arguments with Glaucon indicating that he had not ‘escaped detection’ (ouk elathes … apodidraskôn); and the necessity of ‘paying a penalty’ (hyphekteon dikên). Thus the statement about taking a ‘holiday’ to work out his strategy on his own is put in this context.
6. A little further on (462c) Socrates suggests a similarity between a city and the individual: “What type [of city] is closest to a single person (enggytata henos anthrôpou)? When one of us hurts his finger, the whole organism suffers …” More specifically (at 464a–b) he says that the greatest blessing for a city was the holding of wives and children in common among the guardians and compared (apeikazontes) a well-run city (eû oikoumenên polin) to a body (sômati) in respect to its reaction to pain or pleasure in any part of it. Thus metaphors and similes are intertwined in Socrates’ discussion of the three waves that they must face in analyzing the ideal community.
[a well-run city = a body]
7. “Do you think that there is any difference between (ti diaphoron drâin) people who do this (tous toûto poioûntas [i.e. despoil a corpse]) and (= than) dogs (tôn kynôn) which bark at stones thrown at them but don’t attack the one who throws them?” “Not in the least, he said.” (469e) Socrates [people who despoil a corpse = dogs]
Aristotle (Rhetoric 1406b33–34) cites this passage as a simile, re-phrasing it (replacing ‘any difference between’) and adding the verb “are similar to” (eoikasi).
There is more metaphorical language in this passage (472–473) as Socrates says (472a) “You have made as it were a sudden assault (hôsper katadromên) on my theory without any regard for my natural hesitation (stranggeuomenôi). Perhaps you do not realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves (ta dyô kymate), you are now rolling up against me the ‘great third wave’ [of paradox], the worst of all.” The three waves are presented as (1) the same education for men and women, (2) the community of women and children, and (3) the philosopher-king. Then in support of his claim that such an ideal state might not exist, he gives the analogy of a painter (472), who portrays the pattern (paradeigma) of the ideally beautiful man but could not prove that he existed; would he then be any less good a painter?”
8. “I am on the verge of what we compared to (proeikazomen) the greatest wave (chymati) [of paradox], but it shall be said even if it is likely (mellei) to wash us away (kataklysein), as it were, by a wave of laughter and scorn (gelôti te atechnôs hôsper kyma ekgelôn kai adoxiai).” (473c) Socrates [laughter and scorn = a wave] Literally, the text would mean “wash us away by both laughter and scorn as it were just like a wave.” Thus the ‘wave’ would be the ‘difficult topic of paradox’ combined with laughter and scorn. Cf. Republic 5[4] (above).
There follows “perhaps the most famous sentence in Plato” (Shorey, 473na,): “Unless either philosophers (hoi philosophoi) become kings (basileusôsin) in our states (polesin) or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, in our cities nor, I fancy, for the human race either.” (473d) Socrates
9. “O Socrates, he [Glaucon] said, after throwing out such a bold statement as that (rhêma te kai logon) … (you must) expect that many bold men will, as it were (hoîon) cast off their clothes and take up the first weapons that come to hand and rush at you in battle formation intending to do amazing deeds.” (473e–474a) Glaucon [many bold men (Socrates’ opponents in debate) = soldiers in battle formation]
10–11. “They are like (eoike) those (toîs) [jesters] who fool us with double meanings (epamphoterizousin) at banquets and [resemble] the children’s riddle (tôi paidiôn ainigmati) about the eunuch (toû eunouhou) and his hitting of the bat (tês bolês peri tês nykteridos) …” (479b–c) Glaucon [they = [jesters] or children’s riddle]
“They” are the “many double things” (ta polla diplasia], e.g. the idea of beauty versus beautiful things (479b). See Shorey’s note (530–531nc) for one version of the riddle: “A tale there is, a man yet not a man, [eunuch] / Seeing, saw not, a bird and not a bird, [bat] / Perching upon a bough and not a bough, [reed] / And hit—not, with a stone and not a stone. [pumice-stone]”
Republic VI (484–511) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1935) [Plato VI]
The Philosopher-King; the divided line.
1–2. “Do you think there is any difference (diapherein) between the blind (typhlôn) and those who are truly deprived of knowledge … who have no vivid pattern in their souls and so cannot, as painters (hôsper grapheîs) fix their eyes on the absolute truth? (484c) Socrates [those who are truly deprived of knowledge = the blind; ≠ painters]
3. [Such a man’s] desires (hai epithymiai) [which are strong in one direction] we know are weaker [in other directions] like a stream (hôsper rheûma) whose water has been turned aside.” (485d) Socrates [desires = a stream]
4. “Just as (hôsper) the unskilled (hoi mê teleutôntes) [players] are check-mated (apokleiontai) by experienced [chess] players (petteuein deinôn) and have no place to move, thus (houtô) also these [inexperienced debaters at forming questions and answers] are finally stopped and are not able to say anything when they are trapped not by [chess men (psêphois)] but by words (logois).” (487b–c) Adeimantus, who earlier (487a) had implicitly compared himself to Momos, the god of censure. [inexperienced debaters = unskilled game-board players] Of course the game here alluded to was not chess but the Greek game of pesseia (petteia). Shorey (14nf) cites other Platonic sources for this ‘figure’, including Laws 739a, 820c–d, 903d, Hipparchus 229e.
5. “You ask a question (erôtêma), I said, in need of an answer (apokriseôs) expressed by image (di’ eikonos [comparison, parable or simile] legomenês).” [Socrates] “ I suppose you are not accustomed to speak in similes (di’ eikonôn)” [Adeimantus]. “Well, I said—you are making fun of me after throwing me into such a difficult argument. Then hear my comparison (eikonos) so that you may see how eagerly I make comparisons (hôs glischrôs eikazô: “I strain after imagery” according to Shorey—see 17ng) … but the person making a comparison [or an allegory (eikazonta)] must collect it from many sources … like painters (hoîon hoi grapheîs) who combine goat-stags (trag-elaphous) and such [creatures]. Picture in your mind (noêson) … a shipmaster (nauklêron) in size and strength above all others in the ship but slightly deaf (hypokôphon) and blind (horônta hôsautôs brachy ti).” (487e–488a) Socrates [eikôn-makers = painters who combine animals]
There follows the famous allegory of the shipmaster (488b–e). The explicit simile here is that allegorists (or persons making comparisons) are something like (hoion) painters, and some answers (apokrisis) are best expressed as allegories or similes (eikônes). At 489a there is a suggestion that parables and similes (tên eikona) “should be examined (exetazomenên tên eikona) to determine (idein) if the terms of the comparison (tên diathesin) correspond to (eoiken) [the disposition of] the cities (tais polesi) towards the true philosophers (pros tous alêthinous philosophous).” “Then teach this parable (didaske tên eikona) to the man who is surprised (ekeînon ton thaumazonta) that philosophers are not honored in our cities (hoti hoi philosophoi ou timôntai en taîs polisi).” This passage illustrates the imprecise, or at least non-technical, meaning of eikôn (equivalent here to allegory or parable).
6. “Don’t you think the real pilot (alêthôs kybernêtikon) would actually be called (kaleisthai) a star-gazer (meteôroskopon) and babbler (adoleschên) and simpleton (achrêston) by the sailors in ships managed like this?” (488e–489a) Socrates [the real pilot = a star-gazer] In the next sentence Socrates calls this an eikona when he states, “I suppose that it is not necessary to put the comparison (simile, eikona) to the proof …”
7. “You would make no mistake in likening (apeikazôn) our present political rulers (tous nûn politikôs archontas) to the [sort of] sailors (nautais) we were just describing and those whom these call useless (achrêstous) star-gazing ideologists (meteôroleschas) to the true pilots (hôs alêthôs kybernêtais).” (489c) Socrates [present political rulers = bad sailors; useless star-gazing ideologists = true pilots]
8. “The opinions (ta dogmata) of the many (hoi polloi) which they dare … to call wisdom … just as if (hoionper ei) someone learned about (emanthanen) the passions and desires (tas orgas kai epithymias) of a huge and mighty beast (thremmatos) in his care.” (493a–b) Socrates [opinions of the many = passions of a huge beast]
9–10. “Those who thus fall away [from philosophy] … leaving it deserted and destitute … like an orphan (hôsper orphanên) without relatives … are like men escaped from prison (hôsper hoi ek tôn eirgmôn) who take sanctuary in temples.” (495c–d) Socrates [philosophy = an orphan; philosophic deserters = escaped prisoners seeking refuge in a temple]
11–12. “Do they [men poorly qualified for philosophy (polloi ateleîs anaxioi paideuseôs)] seem … to differ (diapherein) at all from a little bald-headed copper smith who has made some money (chalkeôs), who has just been freed (lelumenou) from his bonds and fresh from a bath (leloumenou), wearing a new cloak, like a bride-groom (hôs nymphiou) about to marry his master’s daughter because of his poverty and need?” (495e) Socrates [bad philosophers = a bald coppersmith = a newly-freed-slave bridegroom]
A remarkable punning description (lelumenou ‘freed’ … leloumenou ‘washed’), with a simile within a simile: bad philosophers = ‘a little bald-headed tinker (Shorey’s phrase) = a bride-groom, etc. Shorey (50na) cites Lovers 134b and Euthyphro 2b as parallels for this short vivid description. (See above under Lovers and Euthyphro.) Plato’s critical portrayal of people who have ‘fallen away’ from philosophy is notable. At 496b–c he refers to “the bridle (ho chalinos) of our companion Theages” which might operate as a restraint; “for in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy (pros to ekpeseîn philosophias), but his sickly habit of body (hê tou sômatos nosotrophia) keeping him out of politics holds him back.” This bridle has become proverbial: Plutarch De san. tuenda 126b, Aelian, Varia Historia 4.15. The LCL translation expresses this as a simile (345): “Theages, our comrade whose delicate health has restrained him from politics like a bridle.”
13–14. “[Those who have tasted philosophy] … seeing sufficiently the madness of the multitude (tên manian tôn pollôn), … [will perish] like (hôsper) a man who has fallen among wild beasts (eis thêria anthrôpos empesôn) … [therefore the philosopher] keeps his silence minding his own business, like (hoîon) someone who stops under a wall (hypo teichion apostas) in a storm of dust and sea-spray carried by the wind.” (496c–d) Socrates [philosopher = a man who has fallen among wild beasts = someone who stops under a wall for protection in a storm]
15. “No state today is worthy of the philosophic nature (philosophou physeôs)—which is the cause of its perversion and alteration, as a foreign seed sown in alien soil (hôsper xenikon sperma en gêi allêi speiromenon) is wont to die out into the native growth …” (497a) Socrates [philosophic nature = a foreign seed sown in alien soil]
16. “[As for] those who take up philosophy in their youth before they engage in business and money-making, towards old age with few exceptions their [light] is quenched (aposbennyntai) more completely than (poly mâllon) the sun (hêliou) of Heracleitus, inasmuch as it is never rekindled.” (498a) Socrates [their light [is quenched] = the sun of Heracleitus] This cluster of similes (9–16) dwells on poorly qualified and trained philosophers.
17. Near the end of Book Six the image of the divided line is presented as a simile: “Conceive (noêson) then … that there are these two [entities] … the visible (horaton) and the intelligible (noêton) … like (hôsper) a line (grammên) divided into two unequal parts” (509d, dicha tetmêmenên labôn anisa tmêmata). (509d) Socrates [the visible (world of appearances) + the intelligible (the world perceived by the mind) = a divided line]
Here is the context: “Neither vision (opsis) nor its vehicle the eye (omma) is identical with the sun (ouk estin hêlios), although the eye is the most sun-like (hêlioeidestaton) of all the instruments of sense (tôn peri tas aesthêseis organôn). An analogy: as the good is to reason, so the eye is to vision. (508a–c). Now apply this [comparison] to the soul (houtô kai to tês psychês hôde noei). (508d) But as for knowledge and truth (epistêmên de kai alêtheian), as in our [illustration] (houtô kai entaûtha), it is right to consider light and vision (phôs te kai opsin) sun-like (hêlioeidê), but never to think they are the sun (hêlion de hêgeîsthai ouk orthôs echei); so it is right to deem these two their counterparts as being like the good (agathoeidê) but to think that either is the good (agathon) is not right (ouk orthon).” [Socrates] “An inconceivable beauty (amêchanon kallos) you speak of if it is the source of knowledge and truth, yet surpasses them in beauty (kallei). For you surely cannot mean that it is pleasure (hêdonên). (509a) [Glaucon] “Hush” (euphêmei), I [Socrates] said, “but examine (episkopei [509b]) the similitude (tên eikona) of it (autoû) still further (eti) in this way.“ [Then Glaucon said:] “Don’t stop but at least expound the similitude of the sun (tên peri ton hêlion homoiotêta aû diexiôn) and don’t omit anything.” [509c: note the two words for ‘similitude’ (simile?): tên eikona and tên homoiotêta]. “One of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball (to d’ aû horatoû), not to say the ‘sky-ball’ (hina mê ouranoû eipôn doxô soi sophizesthai peri to onoma), but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible.” “I do.” (Glaucon) “Perceive them as two parts, one ruling over the noetic area (genous, i.e. perceived by the mind) and one over the visible (perceived by the eyes) … like (hôsper) a line (grammên) divided into two (dicha tetmêmenên) unequal sections.” [509d] Socrates
According to J. Adam’s note, [7] “the simile of the line contains perhaps more Platonic teaching than any passage of equal length in Plato’s writings.”
Republic VII (514–541) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1935) [Plato VI]
Education of the philosophers; allegory of the cave.
1. “After this I said, ‘Imagine an allegory of (apeikason tosoutôi pathei [literally, ‘compare to such an experience’) our nature with regard to education and ignorance (paideias ti peri kai apaideusias). Now picture (ide) humans as (hoîon) in an underground cave-like dwelling (en katageiôi oikêsei spêlaiôdei).’” (514a) Socrates [humans = (people living) in a cave] The allegory of the cave depicts and helps to explain the different levels of understanding described in the simile of the line, where the cave and fire represent the world of appearances visible to the eye, and the eternal, unchanging realm outside the cave represents the intelligible world perceived only by the mind.
2. “Picture (ide, repeated at 514b) a low wall (teichion) built just as (hôsper) for puppet shows (toîs thaumatopoioîs) where the partition (ta paraphragmata) lies before the men above which they show the puppets (ta thaumata).” (514b) Socrates [a low wall in the cave = the wall in puppet shows]
“’A strange (atopon) image (eikona) you speak of,’ he said, ‘and strange prisoners (desmôtas atopous).’ (515a) Glaucon ‘Like us (homoious hêmîn)’, I said.”
3–4. “This image (eikona) then, dear Glaucon, we must apply to all that has been said, likening (aphomoioûnta) the region revealed through sight to the habitation (oikêsei) of the prison and the light of the fire in it to the power (dynamei) of the sun.” (517a–b) Socrates [the region revealed through sight = the prison; the light of the fire in it = the power of the sun] He adds (517d2) that “it is likely (eikos) [that those who have attained this height may not willing to concern themselves with the concerns of men] if in this point too the likeness of our image holds (tên proeirêmenên eikona toût’ echei).”
5. “Education (paideian) is not what some proclaim it to be … that they can put knowledge (epistêmê) into a soul that does not possess it as if (hoîon) inserting vision into blind eyes (typhloîs ophthalmoîs opsin epithentes).” (518b) Socrates [putting education in a soul ≠ inserting vision into blind eyes] Cf. Socrates’ similar observation in Symposium 1: “How fine it would be, Agathon, (he said) if wisdom (sophia) could flow from the fuller to the emptier of us … like water (hôsper hydôr) in cups flowing through wool from the fuller cup to the emptier one …” (175d)
6. “Our argument (logos) indicates that the indwelling power (dynamin) in the soul and the instrument (organon) by which each person learns (katamanthanei) is just as if (hoîon ei) the eye (omma) could not turn toward the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body …” (518c) Socrates [education = turning the eye of the soul]
Note that these two similes (5–6) illustrate the argument that education is not inserting something but rather adjusting the eye of the soul. Shorey’s translation of 518c: “this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periact in the theatre.” (134nc: “probably a reference to the periacta or triangula prisms on each side of the stage.”)
7. “If this part of such a nature from childhood had been hammered and struck free (koptomenon periekopê) of the leaden weights, so to speak (hôsper molybdidas), of our birth … food and similar pleasure … it would have turned towards the true things (eis ta alêthê).” (519a–b) Socrates [food and pleasure = leaden weights of the soul]
8. “We have engendered you (philosophers) for yourselves and the rest of the city (polei) to be, as it were, king-bees and leaders (hêgemonas te kai basileas) in the hive (hôsper en smênesin).” (520b) Socrates [you > the city = king-bees > a bee-hive]
9. “Would you like for us to consider how such men [i.e. guardians / philosophers] may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward to the light even as (hôsper) some are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods (ex Haidou eis theous)?” (521c) Socrates [men led to light = some from Hades became gods] Shorey (146nb) cites Amphiaraus (Pausanias i. 34) as a possible example of such ‘fabled’ men.
10–11. “This [education] would not be (ouk an eiê) the whirling of the shell (ostrakou peristrophê) [in the children’s game], but a conversion of the soul (psychês periagôgê) from night to day … to true philosophy (philosophian alêthê).” (521c) Socrates [true education ≠ whirling of the shell = a conversion of the soul]
What study (mathêma) has the power (dynamin) to draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being (psychês holkon apo toû gignomenou epi to on, 521c–d)?
12. “We must use the blazonry (poikiliai) of the heavens as patterns (paradeigmasi) to aid in the study of those realities, just as (homoiôs hôsper) one would do who chanced upon diagrams (diagrammasi) drawn by Daedalus or some other craftsman or painter (dêmiourgoû ê grapheôs).” (529d–e) Socrates [patterns of heavens = diagrams of Daedalus]
13. “They lay their ears alongside (paraballontes ta ôta) [their instruments], as if trying to hear what their neighbors are saying (hoîon ek geitonôn phônên thêreuomenoi).” (531a) Socrates [listening = trying to hear the neighbors]
“You are speaking about those good people who trouble and torture their strings, stretching them on pegs; but lest our comparison/simile (hê eikôn) become too long—of blows with the plectrum and accusations and denials and boasting of strings—I am dropping the figure (pauomai tês eikonos, 531b).” Socrates (The implied comparison between torturing slaves and tuning a lyre is expressed metaphorically and not explicitly in the Greek: “Those worthies (tous chrêtous [ironic]) who vex and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs” (tous taîs chordaîs pragmata parechontas kai basanizontas, epi tôn kollopôn strebloûntas, 531b). He continues the musical theme at 532d–e: “Let us assume that these things are as now has been said and proceed to the melody itself (ton nomon) and go through it as we have gone through the prelude (houtôs hôsper to prooimion diêlthomen). Cf. 533a: “If I could, I would show you no longer an image or symbol (eikona), as it appears to me, of my meaning, but the very truth (auto to alêthes).”
14. “Does it then seem to you, I said, that for us dialectic lies like a coping stone for our subjects of education (he dialektikê hôsper thri(n)gkos tois mathêmasin)?” (534e) Socrates [dialectic = the copingstone of education]
15. “We shall regard as maimed (anapêron) the soul that hates the voluntary lie (hekousion pseûdos) … and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge but wallows in [the mud of] ignorance (en amathiai) [as] insensitively (hôsper eucherôs) as a pig (hôsper thêrion hyeion, literally: a swinish beast).” (535e) Socrates [the maimed soul = a pig]
16. “We must bring children to war on horseback to be spectators … and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps (hôsper tous skylakas).” (537a) Socrates [children = whelps]
17. “They delight like puppies (hôsper skylakia) in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them. (539b) Socrates [They (the young men who have gotten a taste of disputation (hotan to prôton logôn geuôntai) = puppies] This could apply to Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus in Euthydemus.
18. “And the state shall establish public memorials and sacrifices for them [the guardians] as to divinities (autoîs hôs daimosin) if the Pythian oracle approves.” (540b–c) Socrates [they = divinities]
19. “A most beautiful finish, Socrates, you have put upon your rulers, as if you were a statuary (hôsper andiantopoios).” Glaucon “And on the women too, Glaucon.” Socrates (540c) [Socrates = a statuary]
The similes in Book Seven deal with the Cave (1–4) and the education of Guardians (5–19).
Republic VIII (543–569) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1935) [Plato VI]
Decline of the polis; four types of government (especially similes 3 and 6–18)
1. None of them [the rulers] should have anything that ordinary men now possess but that, being as it were (hôsper) athletes of war and guardians (athlêtas te polemou kai phylakas), … they should devote their entire attention to the care of themselves and the state.” (543b–c) Glaucon [the rulers = athletes of war and guardians]
2. “Then [you] give me the same hold again, like a wrestler (hôsper palaistês), and when I ask the same question, try to express what you meant to say.” (544b) Glaucon [you/Socrates = a wrestler in the wrestling match of dialectic, with Socrates and Glaucon the wrestlers] An appropriate simile in a discussion of rulers as athletes.
3. “And then the noble tyranny (gennaia dê tyrannis) surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady of the state (poleôs nosêma).” (544c) Socrates [tyranny = a malady of the state]
4–5. “Shall we, like Homer (hôsper Homêros), invoke the Muses … and say that they were teasing us as though we were children (hôs pros paîdas) in addressing us in lofty, mock-serious tragic style.?” (545d) Socrates [we = Homer; we = children]
6. Such men (hoi toioûtoi) [of the intermediate state between aristocracy and oligarchy, 548a] will be prodigal of others’ wealth because of their appetites … and running away from the law as boys from a father (hôsper paîdas patera … apodidraskontes).” (548b) Socrates [bad leaders > the law = boys > their father]
7. The oligarchic man: “Shall we say of him that as the drone springs up in the cell (hôs en kêriôi kêphên eggignetai), a pest of the hive (smênous nosêma), so (houtô) such a man grows up in his home (en oikiai kêphêna), a pest of the state (nosêma poleôs)?” (552c) Socrates [the oligarchic man, a pest of the state = a drone, a pest of the hive]
8. “The son of the timocratic man at first emulates his father … then sees him suddenly dashed, as a ship on a reef (hôsper pros hermati pros têi polei).” (553a) Socrates [the father having a sudden calamity (court, exile, loss of property) = ship on a reef]
9–10. “[This form of government democracy] is the most beautiful of governments. Like a garment of many colors (hôsper himation poikilon) embroidered with all flowers … like (hôsper) women and children looking at broidered robes, many would judge it the most beautiful.” (557c) Socrates [democracy = a beautiful robe of many colors; many judging democracy the most beautiful = women and children looking at robes]
11. “Anyone wishing to organize a state … must go to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if (hôsper) in a bazaar of constitutions (eis pantopôlion)” (557d) Socrates [a democratic city = a bazaar of constitutions]
12. “In such a state a man condemned to death or exile remains and goes back and forth among the people, slipping in and out like a revenant (hôsper hêrôs).” (558a) Socrates [a condemned man = a free spirit, one returned from the dead]
13–14. “They [= another brood of desire] seize the acropolis of the young man’s soul (tên toû neou tês psychês akropolin), finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses (mathêmata te kai epitêdeumata kala), which are (eisi) the best watchmen and guardians (aristoi phrouroi te kai phylakes) in the minds of men who are dear to the gods (en andrôn theophilôn dianoiais).” (560b) Socrates [young man’s soul = a city’s acropolis; liberal studies = the best guardians in the minds of men]
15–16. “The class of lazy and extravagant men (to tôn argôn te kai dapanêrôn andrôn genos) [in a democracy] … whom we compare to drones (aphômoioûmen kêphêsi) some with stings and some without … cause trouble when they are present in every form of government, just like phlegm and bile in the body (hoîon peri sôma phlegma te kai cholê). (564b) Socrates [idlers in a democracy = drones = phlegm and bile]
17. “A good doctor and lawmaker no less than (mê hêtton ê) a wise bee-keeper (sophon melittourgon) must try … to cut them out as quickly as possible along with the honeycombs themselves.” (564c) Socrates [lawmaker = a wise bee-keeper]
Marsh McCall, Jr. (Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison, Harvard University Press, 1969, 11) points out a simile involving drones attributed to Socrates by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus (17.14): “The weeds must be cut, of course, just as [hôsper] the drones must be removed from the hive.”
18. “In a democracy the leading group [does the talking] … while the other [group] buzzes (bombeî) around the speakers’ platform and does not allow anyone else (e) to say anything … I think they take most of the honey from the hives … Those who are wealthy are called (kaloûntai) the food of the hives … (564d–e). [The mass of people does not assemble] unless it gets some of the honey (melitos ti metalambanê).” (565a) Socrates [wealth of a city = honey of beehives]
Republic IX (571–592) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1935) [Plato VI]
Justice is better than injustice.
1. (a) And must not such men [whose souls are governed by the tyrant eros (573d)], urged as it were by the goads both of their other desires (hôsper hypo kentrôn
… tôn te allôn epithymiôn) and especially by Eros himself, (b) being led by all the other desires as though by spear-bearers (hôsper doryphorois hêgoumenou), run wild and look to see who has anything that can be taken away by deceit or violence? (573e) Socrates [desires = goads and spear-bearers]
At 574d his newly released opinions are called bodyguards (doryphoroûsai) of his ruling passion.
2. “The tyrant (ho tyrannos) is the only one who cannot travel abroad to sacred festivals like other citizens, but must live for the most part cowering (katadedukôs) in his house like [hôs] a woman (gynê).” (579b) Socrates [the tyrant = a woman]
3. “The tyrannical man, unable to control himself, attempts to rule over others, as if (hôsper) a man with a sick and incontinent body should not live the private life but be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with others.” (579c–d) Socrates [tyrant = a man with a sick and incontinent body]
4. “Let us carry on the discussion by creating an image (eikona) of the soul so that the speaker may know what he said. (588b) … One of those old [figures] … such as (hoîai) myth-makers used to describe, the Chimaira or Scylla or Cerberus, and several others are said to be many forms grown into one… Create (platte) then one figure of a multi-shaped many-headed monster (thêriou) … able to change its shape …” (588b–c) Socrates [the soul = a many-shaped mythical figure like the Chimaira or Cerberus]
5. “[According to the man who says that justice is the more profitable] the inner man will be strongest and will take charge of the many-headed beast like (hôsper) a farmer, who nourishes the milder elements but prevents the wild weeds from growing.” (589b) Socrates [the inner man = a farmer]
6. “Can it profit any man to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be the enslavement of the best part of himself to the worst? (589d) … According to this argument does it benefit anyone to take money [from someone] unjustly? … Is he not truly wretched and doesn’t he receive his gold at a far more terrible (epi deinoterôi) destruction (olethrôi ‘price’) than (ê) Eriphyle (Eriphylê) who accepted a necklace for her husband’s life?” (590a) Socrates [someone who takes money unjustly = Eriphyle]
Republic X (595–621) Paul Shorey, LCL 1978 (1935) [Plato VI]
Rewards of justice in life and death; the myth of Er.
1. “Do not [the words of poets (ta tôn poiêtôn)] resemble (eoike) the faces of young men (toîs tôn hôraiôn prosôpois), handsome but not really beautiful, when the bloom [of youth] abandons them?” (601b) Socrates [the words of poets = the faces of young men]
2. “Our grieving checks the thing we need to come to our aid as soon as possible.” What thing?” “To deliberate (tôi bouleuesthai) about what has happened, and, as it were (hôsper) in the fall of dice (en ptôsei kybôn) to determine the movements of our affair with reference to the number that turns up (pros ta peptôkota) according to reason would be best …” (604c) Socrates [deliberation = checking the number on the dice]
3. … instead of stumbling like children (kathaper paîdas), clapping one’s hands to the stricken spot and wasting time in wailing … ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt, ‘banishing threnody by therapy’ (Shorey’s alliterative translation of iatrikêi thrênôidian aphanizonta)” (604c) Socrates [we in grief (from [2] above) = children stumbling]
4. “Just as (hôsper) men who have fallen in love (hoi pote tou erasthentes), if they think the love is not good for them … nevertheless refrain (apechontai) … so we (kai hêmeîs houtôs) owing to the love of this kind of poetry (dia ton enggegonota men erôta tês toiautês poiêseôs) inbred in us by our education … we shall chant this counter-charm to her spell (tautên tên epôidên).” (607e) Socrates [we will chant a counter-charm = men who have fallen in love will refrain] Thus Socrates continues to justify his rejection of poetry from the city as the right thing to do (607b), compelled by the argument (ho logos) in “the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (palaia men tis diaphora philosophiai te kai poiêtikêi, 607b5–6).
5. “For practically everything there is its congenital evil and disease (schedon pâsi symphyton hekastôi kakon te kai nosêma) … as (hoîon) for the eyes (ophthalmois) ophthalmia and for the body (sômati) disease (noson).” (609a) Socrates [for everything an evil: ophthalmia > the eyes = disease > the body]
6. “Just as (hôsper) the vice (ponêria) of the body being (oûsa ‘like’) sickness (nosos) weakens and destroys (diollusi) it so that it is no longer a body at all, in like manner (kai) in all the examples we cited it was the native evil (tês oikeias kakias) that … reduces it to nothing.” (609c) Socrates [vice of the body = sickness]
Much earlier (Republic 470c) Socrates had said metaphorically that Greece was sick when it was (literally “and”) divided by factions (nosein … tên Hellada kai stasiazein).
7. “Let us propose that it [the soul’s condition] resembles (diakeimenon) that of the sea-god Glaucus (hôsper hoi ton thalattion Glaûkon horôntes) [literally: ‘it is disposed as those seeing Glaukus of the sea’]: you could not easily see his original nature because the original limbs of his body are broken off and mutilated … by the waves and other things have attached themselves to him, shells and sea-weed and rocks, so that he appears like (eoikenai hoîos) every other wild creature than what he was by nature. This is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon.” (611d) Socrates [the soul = the sea-god Glaucus] Perhaps a humorous allusion to the sea-god whose name so closely resembles that of Plato’s brother.
8. “Do not your smart but wicked men do the very thing which (hoper) those racers do (hoi dromês) who run well ‘from the down’ [at the start] but not ‘from the up’ [back] … But the true runners come to the goal and receive the prizes and are crowned.” (613b–c) Socrates [smart but wicked men = poor racers]
(The next few similes come from the myth of Er (that starts at 614b): his return from death and his vision of the life beyond the grave.)
9–10. “They discerned (kathorân) … a straight light (phôs euthy) like (hoîon) a pillar (kiona) most nearly resembling the rainbow (malista têi iridi prospherê) but brighter (lamproteran) and purer (katharôteran). (616b) Socrates [a light = a pillar; light = the rainbow]
11–12. Then they saw at the middle of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven; for this light (toûto to phôs) was (eînai) the girdle of the heavens (syndesmon toû ouranoû) like the undergirders of triremes (hoîon ta hypozômata tôn triêrôn).” (616c) Socrates [this light = the girdle of the heavens = the undergirders of triremes]
13. “And from the extremities (ek tôn akrôn) was stretched (tetamenon) the spindle of Necessity ([ho sphondulos] Anangkês atrakton), through which all the orbits (periphoras) turned. (616c) And the nature (tên physin) of the whorl (toû sphondylou) was this (toiande): its shape (to schêma) was that of our world (hoiaper hê toû enthade) but we must conceive it to be as if (hôsper) in one great whorl, hollow and scooped out, there lay enclosed another like it but smaller, fitting into it like boxes (kathaper hoi kadoi) that fit into one another (hoi eis allêla harmottontes), eight whorls (sphondylous) in all.” (616d) Socrates [eight whorls = boxes]
14. “When all the souls (pasas tas psychas) had chosen their lives (bious) in the order of their lots (hôsper elachon, 620d), … then suddenly they were carried up one after the other (in different directions) to their birth darting like stars (hôsper asteras).” (621b) Socrates reporting Er’s vision [souls = stars]
15. “But if we are persuaded by me, considering the soul immortal … we shall practice justice along with wisdom in every way, in order to become friends both with ourselves and with the gods (621a) … and when we receive our rewards (ta athla) like victors in the games (hôsper hoi nikêphoroi) collecting their [prizes] … we shall prosper (eû prattômen).” (621d) Socrates [we = athletic victors] Near the end of the Apology (36d) Socrates suggests a similar comparison with Olympic victors, who are given meals in the prytaneum. He deserves that prize more than such a winner in a horse race because “he makes you seem happy, whereas I make you happy in reality (hymâs poieî eudamonas dokeîn, egô de eînai).”
Sophist (St I.216a–268b) = H. N. Fowler, LCL 1977 (1921) [Plato VII)
What is a sophist?
1. “There are two kinds of evil (duo eidê kakias) in the soul … the one is like (hoîon) a disease (noson) in the body, the other a deformity (aîschos).” (227d–228a) The Eleatic Visitor [two kinds of evil in the soul = a disease and a deformity in the body]
N.B. the reference (228c) to aiming at something and missing the mark as an illustration of ‘disproportion’ but as Fowler’s note says (309) “the connexion between disproportion and missing the mark in not obvious.”
2. “Just as (hôsper) physicians (hoi peri ta sômata iatroi) … believe the body cannot benefit from food until all obstructions (ta empodizonta) are removed, [so] those concerned with the soul (kai peri psychês … ekeinoi) have come to the same conclusion … by removing the opinions (doxas) that obstruct (empodious) the teachings (tois mathêmasin) …” For all these reasons … we must assert that cross-questioning (ton elengchon) is the greatest … of all purifications (tôn katharseôn).” (230c–d) The Eleatic Visitor [those concerned with the soul = physicians of the body]
3. “A wolf (lukos) is very similar to (proseoike) a dog (kyni), the wildest to the mildest [of animals]. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances (tas homoiotêtas), for they are very slippery things (olisthêrotaton to genos).” (231a) The Eleatic Visitor [a wolf (wildest) = a dog (mildest)] See references to dogs and wolves in Appendix II-J.
4. “Stopping (stantes) as it were (hoîon) let us catch our breath (exapneusômen). Let us count up the number of forms (dialogisômetha) in which the sophist has appeared to us (231c–d).” In his summary of this part of the Dialogue (231d) the Eleatic Visitor uses a series of predicate similes to define the Sophist. He was found to be (hêurethê): (1st) a paid hunter (emmisthos thêreutês) after the young (neôn) and wealthy (plousiôn); (2nd) a kind of merchant (emporos tis) in articles of knowledge in the soul (ta tês psychês mathêmata); (3rd) a retailer (kapêlos) of these articles of knowledge; (4th) a seller (autopôlês) of his own productions of knowledge; (added by Theaetetus) (5th) an athlete (athlêtês) in contests of words (tês agônistikês peri logous); (6th) a purger of souls (peri psychên kathartên), who removes opinions (doxôn) that obstruct (empodiôn) learning (mathêmasi—231e). [the sophist = paid hunter, merchant, retailer, seller, athlete, purger of souls]
5. “Is this now clear that he (the sophist) is (esti) a kind of juggler (tôn goêtôn … tis), an imitator of realities (mimêtês ôn tôn ontôn)? (235a) The Eleatic Visitor [the sophist = a juggler and imitator]
At 235b the Visitor proposes to divide the “image-making art” (eidôlopoiikên technên) in order to capture the sophist, but he does not return to this until 264c.
6–7. “There truly seems to be (eoike ge) among them [the sophists] some sort of (hoîon) Battle of the Giants (gigantomachia tis) on account of their dispute (tên amphisbêtêsin) about existence (peri tês ousias)… Some of them drag down to earth everything from heaven and the invisible, picking up rocks and trees (petras kai drûs), as it were (atechnôs) [= arguments] with their hands.” (246a–b) The Eleatic Visitor [sophists’ dispute = Battle of the Giants; arguments (en tois logois, 246c) = rocks and trees]
8. “Whence (Hothen) [referring to our discussion (ton logon), 251a] I think we have provided (pareskeuakamen) a feast (thoinên) for the young and the late-learners among the old.” (251b) The Eleatic Visitor [discussion (logos) = a feast]
9. “But as the saying goes (to legomenon), having an enemy and future opponent at home, they carry it [the argument about existence] around with them always wherever they go, speaking from within (entos hypophthenggomenon) like (hôsper) the amazing Eurycles (ton atopon Euryklea) [a ventriloquist of the fifth century BC].” (252c) The Eleatic Visitor “That is a remarkably accurate illustration (or ‘simile’, komidêi legeis homoion te kai alêthes),” Theaetetus adds. [philosophers who refute themselves = the ventriloquist Eurycles]
10. “Inasmuch as some things are willing to do this [mingle with one another], and some won’t, they would almost be like letters (hoîon ta grammata) [of the alphabet]. For some of these do not fit with each other, but others do.” (253a) The Eleatic Visitor [things that sometimes combine with other things = letters of the alphabet]
11. “The vowels, unlike the other [letters], move through them all like a chain (hoion desmos (253a) The Eleatic Visitor [vowels = a chain (in words that holds them together)]
12. “Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building (oikodomikê), and by the art of painting (graphikê) make another [house, oikian], a sort of (hoîon) man-made dream (onar anthrôpinon) produced for those who are awake (egrêgorosin)?” (266c) The Eleatic Visitor [a house by the art of painting (graphikê) = a man-made dream]
13. “Let us examine the opinion-imitator (ton doxomimêtên) like a piece of iron (hôsper sidêron).” (267d–e) The Eleatic Visitor [the opinion-imitator = a piece of iron]
The sophist was classed among those who imitate—hence the scrutiny. N.B. Fowler’s suggestion in his Introduction (261) that the tedium of the “process of dichotomy” in this Dialogue “may possibly be one of Plato’s reasons for making the Stranger, not Socrates, the chief speaker in these two dialogues” [i.e. the Statesman also].
Statesman (or Politician) (St II.257a–311c ) = H. N. Fowler 1975 (1924) [Plato VIII]
What is a statesman?
In form a continuation of The Sophist; as in that Dialogue the dramatic form is hardly more than a convention (Fowler’s Introduction, 2).
1–2. “But we shall find that the statesman (politikon) is not a keeper of a single animal, like some ox-driver (hôsper boêlatên) or horse groom (hippokomon), but more similar to (mâllon proseoikota) a horse- or cattle-herder (hippophorbôi, bouphorbôi)” (261d) The Visitor [statesman ≠ an ox-driver = a horse- or cattle-herder]
3. “I say that [we] should consider the statesmanlike and royal man like a charioteer (hoîon hêniochon) … (and) hand over the reins of the city to him.” (266e) The Visitor [statesman = a charioteer]
4. “You have cleared up the argument finely and just as if it were a debt you were paying (kathaperei chrea apedôkas) you threw in the digression (ektropên) as interest (hoîon tokon).” (267a) Young Socrates [argument > digression = debt > interest]
5. “The herdsman (bouphorbos) himself [is] the caretaker of the herd (tês agelês trophos), he himself is its doctor (iatros), he himself is like its matchmaker (hoîon numpheutês)…” (268a–b) The Visitor [herdsman = caretaker = doctor = matchmaker of the herd]
6. “Please pay careful attention, just as if you were a child (kathaper hoi paîdes ‘like children’), and anyway you are not much too old for children’s tales.” (Panu proseche ton noûn kathaper hoi paîdes: pantôs ou polla ekpheugeis paidias etê.) Again we may note Plato’s use of alliteration for comic effect. (268e) The Visitor [you = a child]
7. “Just as statue-makers (kathaper andriantopoioi) who sometimes in their misapplied enthusiasm make too numerous … additions and thus delay the completion of their works, we too (kai nûn hêmeîs) … have taken up a marvelous mass of myth and … [have used] a greater part than we should.” (277a–b) The Visitor [we = statue-makers]
8. “Our talk, just like a picture of a living creature (atechnôs hôsper zôi), seems to have a good enough outline, but not yet the clearness that comes from pigments and blending of colours.” (277c) The Visitor [our talk = a picture of a living creature]
9. (a) “It would seem that each of us knows everything he knows as if in a dream (hoîon onar eidôs) and then (b) when he is as it were awake (hôsper hypar), knows nothing at all.” (277d) The Visitor [we know everything = in a dream; we know nothing = awake]
10. “Let us divide [the arts concerned with the state (287b)], like an animal that is sacrificed (hoîon hiereion), by joints (kata melê) since we cannot bisect them.” (287c) The Visitor [the arts concerned with the state = a sacrificial animal]
11. “It [a receptacle, anggeîon] is not like a tool (kathaper organon) made for the purpose of production but exists for the preservation of that which has been produced.” (287e) The Visitor [a receptacle ≠ a tool]
12. “They are a mixed race (pamphylon) … many of them (polloi) are like (eikasi) lions (leousi) and centaurs and other fierce creatures and very many (pampolloi) are like (eikasi) satyrs (satypois) … (291a–b) The Visitor [many of them = lions; very many = satyrs]
13. “We see that law (nomon) aims at this very thing, like (hôsper) a stubborn and ignorant man (anthrôpon) who allows no one to do anything contrary to his command … not even to ask a question, not even if something new and better occurs to someone …” (294e) The Visitor [law = a stubborn and ignorant man]
14. “Just as the captain of a ship (hôsper ho kybernêtês) keeps watch for what is good for the vessel and sailor not by writing rules but by making his science his law (tên technên nomon), so (houtô) may not right government be established in the same way … making science (technê) more powerful than the laws?” (296e–297a) The Visitor [right government = the captain of a ship]
This simile is referred to later (297e) as images (eikonas) of the noble captain of a ship and the physician to portray kingly rulers: “Let us make a simile (schêma) and use it to help us discover “something of this sort” (298a: toionde hoîon ei): “Imagine that we all thought in regard to captains and physicians ‘we are most abominably treated by them.’ Then a long discussion (298–301) of what would happen if there were bad laws and rulers, alluding at one point to the trial of Socrates (299b–c). This schêma is perhaps better called a long analogy than a simile, although a simile is placed at the end of this long discussion (#15):
15. “There is not … in our cities (polesi) a king (basileus) such as (hoîos) is born in bee-hives (en smênesin emphyetai).” (301e) The Visitor [king in our cities ≠ in bee-hives]
16. “Many [cities] in fact sometimes also exactly like (kathaper) ships sinking perish [because of the worthlessness of their captains and sailors].” (302a) The Visitor [many cities = ships]
17. “The seventh [form of government] must be set apart from the others, just as (hoîon) God (theon) is set apart from man (ex anthrôpôn).” (303b) The Visitor [The seventh form of government = [G]od]
The seventh form refers to right government (monarchy with laws), the best form after monarchy.
18. “This part has been exactly like a play (atechnôs hêmîn hôsper drâma)… As we said (kathaper errhêthê) … a festive troop of centaurs and satyrs was coming into view (291a).” (303c) The Visitor [This part = a play]
19. “I think we (moi phainometha) are in somewhat the same position as refiners of gold (toîs chryson kathairousi pathos homoîon peponthenai).” (303e) The Visitor [we = refiners of gold]
20. “[The true and natural Statesman’s art] itself giving orders and supervising, just as (kathaper) [the art of] weaving supervises and directs the carders [and others] …” (308d) The Visitor [statesman’s art = weaving]
21. This weaving imagery continues into the next section (309b) where the Visitor specifies how “people with courageous natures, like the warp in weaving (hoîon stêmonophyes),” are spun together by the statesman’s art with “those of opposite inclinations towards moderation, thick and soft and, to continue the simile (kata tên eikona), [like] the threads of the woof (krokôdei dianêmati proschrômenas).” [courage > moderation = the warp > the woof]
The Visitor summarizes this relationship between ‘kingly weaving’ (basilikês synhyphanseôs) and governing at 310e and continuing to the end of the Dialogue (311c).
Symposium (St III.172a–223d) = W. R. M. Lamb LCL 1953 (1925) [Plato V (III)]
The genesis, purpose and nature of love (erôs).
Also C. J. Rowe, Plato Symposium, OCT text (edited with an introduction, translation and commentary) Aris and Phillips Ltd, 1998.
1. “How fine it would be, Agathon, (he said) if wisdom (sophia) could flow from the fuller to the emptier of us … like water (hôsper hydôr) in cups flowing through wool from the fuller cup to the emptier one …” (175d) Socrates [wisdom ≠ water]
2. “My [wisdom (sophia)] would be somewhat slight (phaulê tis), and doubtful (amphisbêtêsimos), like a dream (hôsper onar ousa).” (175e) Socrates [wisdom = a dream]
3. “For perhaps Heraclitus [Frg. 51 Diels-Krantz] means—since he does not express himself clearly—that the One (to hen) at variance with itself is brought into agreement with itself (diapheromenon autô hautôi sympheresthai), like (hôsper) [the] harmony of a bow and a lyre (harmonian toxou te kai lyras).” (187a) Eryximachus [the One = harmony of a bow and lyre]
4. “And when they wanted to run swiftly, just as acrobats (hôsper kybistôntes) holding their legs out straight tumble in a circle, rolling on all eight limbs they moved quickly round and round (kyklôi).” (190a) Aristophanes [early humans (hoi anthrôpoi palai) = ‘tumblers’]
5–6. “He [Zeus] began to cut the humans in two, like people slicing sorb-apples (hôsper hoi ta oa temnontes) to pickle them or like people [slicing] eggs (hôsper hoi ta ôia ) with hairs (thrixin).” (190d) Aristophanes [Zeus = people slicing apples; = people slicing eggs]
7. “[Then Apollo turned their faces around] drawing their skin together at the part now called the belly like draw-string purses (hôsper ta syspasta ballantia).” (190e) Aristophanes [their navel skin pulled together = draw-string purses]
8. “For up until then they hid their genitals (ta aidoîa) on the outside and copulated not in each other but in the ground, like cicadas (hôsper hoi tettiges).” (191b) Aristophanes [they = cicadas or crickets]
9. “Thus each of us is a tally of a human being (anthropou symbolon), since he has been sliced like (hôsper) a flatfish (psêttai) making him two out of one.” (191d) Aristophanes [early anthrôpoi = flatfish] Thus destroying the ideal union of “one from two” (ek dyoîn heîs, 192e).
10–11. “There is fear that if we fail to behave [= are not orderly towards the gods], we shall be split again and go around like figures worked in relief on grave-stones (hôsper hoi en taîs stêlais katagraphên ektetypômenoi), sawn in half down our noses, becoming like tokens of split dice (hôsper lispai). “ (193a) Aristophanes [we = grave-stone figures in relief; = tokens of split dice] Aristophanes according to Plato is obviously fond of similes [4–11], as is Alcibiades [14–16].
12. “[The student of love] must be led to the branches of knowledge (epistêmes) … and looking on beauty in the mass (pros poly) may escape from beauty in the individual (tôi para eni), like an attendant (hôsper oiketês) loving the beauty of a child or some man or one practice (epitêdeumatos).” (210d) Diotima to Socrates [student of love = an attendant]
13. “This is the correct way to proceed towards erotics or to be led by someone, starting from the beautiful aspects of a particular handsome individual to advance upwards, just as using steps (hôsper epanabasmoîs chrômenoi) from one to two and from two to all handsome bodies (sômata) … to beautiful practices (epitêdeumata) … to beautiful lessons (mathêmata) and to knowledge (to mathêma) itself, which is to know finally what beauty is (to kalon).” (211c) Diotima to Socrates [progress in erotics = climbing steps]
14–15. “I am going to try to praise Socrates … through images (= similes, eikonôn) … and the purpose of the comparison (hê eikôn) will be to tell the truth (toû alêthous), not to ridicule (toû geloiou). For I say that he [Socrates] is most similar to (homoiotaton) those Silenuses (toîs silênois) sitting in the statuaries’ shops …” (215a) —“Moreover I say that he is like (eoikenai) the satyr Marsyas (tôi satyrôi Marsyai).” (215b) Alcibiades [Socrates = a Silenus; Socrates = the satyr Marsyas]
In this detailed comparison that continues through 216 the ‘visual images’ (eikônes) are first presented in the normal fashion of similes, with protheses (“most similar too” and “is like”); but as his description continues, Alcibiades leaves out such introductory expressions and speaks of Socrates directly as an aulos-player: “Are you not [ouk + eî from the previous sentence) an aulêtês much more wonderful [than] him (ekeinou) [Marsyas]?” (215b) and a little later as “this Marsyas” (215e) and “this satyr” (216c). These expressions illustrate the easy transition between similes with and without protheses.
16. “So I force myself to flee from him (Socrates) blocking my ears as though (hôsper) running from the Sirens in order not to grow old sitting beside him.” (216a) Alcibiades [I fleeing from Socrates = running from the Sirens]
Theaetetus (St I.142a–210d) = H. N. Fowler, LCL 1977 (1921) [Plato VII)
On the nature of knowledge (epistêmê).
1. “Those who, like him (hôsper houtos) [Theaetetus], have quick, sharp minds and good memories, and usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away like (hôsper) ships without ballast (ta anermatista ploîa) …” (144a–b) Theodorus to Socrates [most young men like Theatetus = ships without ballast]
2. “But this boy advances toward learning … smoothly … like (hoîon) a stream of oil (elaiou rheûma) flowing without a sound …” (144b) Theodorus [Theaetetus = a stream of oil]
3a–b. (a)“Those who associate with me (hoi emoi sunggignomenoi) suffer the same thing as (= are like) women in childbirth (paschousi … toûto tauton taîs tiktousais).” (151a) Socrates [my associates > me = women in childbirth > midwife]
(b) Socrates says that his skill lies in distinguishing a false image (eidolon kai pseudos) of wisdom from a true and genuine understanding of it (dianoia ê gonimon te kai alêthes) although he himself is sterile (agonos) with regard to wisdom (150c). Socrates diagnoses Theaetetus as being in pain from a kind of pregnancy (kyoûnta) and that he as the son of a midwife (maîas hyon) can help him. (151b–c) Plato’s language stops short of saying that Socrates is like a midwife (I have what midwives have [tode ge kai emoi hyparchei hoper taîs maîais]), although Socrates does use a predicate form: “the god compels me to serve as a midwife (maieuesthai me ho theos anakazei), but has prevented me from having children (gennân).” [I = a midwife]
4–5. “We honored him [Protagoras] like a god (hôsper theon) but in intellect he was no better than any other man, or for that matter than a tadpole (ouden beltiôn batrachou gyrinou).” (161c–d) Socrates [Protagoras ≠ a god; he = a tadpole]
6. “We seem to be like (dikên) some low-born rooster (alektryonos agennoûs) leaping up from the argument to crow before winning the victory.” (164c) Socrates [we = low-born rooster]
7. “Speaking of pigs and baboons (hys … kai kynokephalous legôn) not only do you act like a pig yourself (autos hyêneis) [but you persuade your listeners to act like this towards my writings and this is not right].” (166c–d) Socrates (quoting Protagoras) [you/Socrates = a pig] Cf. the pig passages cited under Laches 196d–e and Lovers 134b.
8. “And, my dear Socrates, I am far from calling (polloû deô legein) the wise (tous sophous) ‘frogs’ (batrachous) but rather ‘physicians’ when they deal with bodies and ‘farmers’ when they work with plants.” (167b) Socrates (quoting Protagoras) [the wise ≠ frogs = physicians or farmers]
9–10. “But you [Socrates] seem to me to tend more towards Sciron (mâllon teinein pros Skirôna), for the Lacedaimonians order people to leave or else undress, but you seem to play the role rather like Antaeus (kat’ Antaîon ti moi mâllon dokeîs to drâma drân) for you do not allow anyone who approaches you to pass before you compel him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.” (169a–b) Theodorus [you/Socrates = Sciron or Antaeus] Socrates replies (169b): “You compared my illness excellently, Theaetetus. But I am more stubborn than they. For thousands of Heracleses and Theseuses are strong in speaking.”
11. “Those who have spent time in the courts from their youth on seem to me to be like (hôs) house-slaves (oiketai) compared to free men (pros eleutherous) brought up in philosophy.” (172c–d) Socrates [court-room devotés = house-slaves]
12–13. “[Socrates,] you spoke well when you said that we who belong to this ‘chorus’ are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are like (hôsper) our servants; and each of them (i.e. the arguments) must wait for us to be finished, whenever we decide; for we have neither judge nor any spectator set over us like (hôsper) the poets to censure and rule us.” (173c) Theodoros [arguments = our servants; we the chorus ≠ servants of arguments; we ≠ the poets]
14. “They (philosophers) pay no more (mâllon) attention to (lelêthen ‘escape notice’) those matters [affairs of state and society] than to (ê) the number of pints in the sea (tês thalattês legomenoi choes), as the saying is.” (173d) Socrates [public affairs (to philosophers) = pints in the sea] Socrates then cites the jest about Thales falling into a pit because he was so engrossed in looking at the stars.
15. “Calling Socrates to an argument [is like] calling (literally: he calls) the cavalry to an open plain (hippeas eis pedion prokaleî Sokratê eis logous prokaloumenos).” (183d) Theodorus [calling Socrates to an argument = calling the cavalry onto an open plain] A proverbial expression.
16. “For the sake of argument (the logos) assume that in our souls there is a wax mold … Let us say that it is a gift of Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses, and whatever we want to remember of the things we see and hear … we stamp on this as though (hôsper) making impressions from seal rings.” (191c–d) Socrates (comparing memories to waxen tablets placed in our souls by Mnemosyne) [remembering something = stamping on a wax mold in our soul with a signet ring]
17–19. “One final subject then is [the source of] false opinions: for example, when recognizing you (Theaetetus) and Theodorus, and having the imprints of both of you on that block of wax, as if you were signet-rings (hôsper daktyliôn) but seeing you both at a distance and indistinctly, I try to assign the proper imprint of each of you to the proper vision, and to make it fit its own footprint to ensure recognition; but if I interchange them, and put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as (hôsper) people put a shoe on the wrong foot; or, see the right side on the left, as (hoîa) the sight is affected when we look in a mirror I make the same mistake.” (193b–c) Socrates [your impressions = signet rings; errors in vision = putting a shoe on the wrong foot; errors in vision = looking in a mirror and seeing the sides reversed]
20. “Like (hoîon) a bad archer … he misses the target and this is called error (pseûdos). (194a) Socrates [error = a bad archer missing the target] This group of similes (17–20) is on the subject of errors in argument.
21. “If a man bought a cloak (himation) … but did not wear it, we could say, not that he had (echein) it, but that he possessed (kektêsthai) it. (197b) Now see if it is possible in the same way to possess knowledge and not have it, just as if someone (hôsper ei tis) had caught some wild birds (ornithes agrias) pigeons (peristeras) or something else, after preparing an aviary (peristeriôna) and raised them at home.” (197c) “Now moreover in each soul let us put a kind of aviary (peristeriôna tina) [stocked] with all sorts of birds etc. (197d) … but instead of birds (anti ornithôn) we perceive types of knowledge (epistemas) (197e). Socrates to Theaetetus [knowledge = wild birds caught and placed in an aviary in our soul]
22. The hunt for knowledge (thêran epistêmôn) [is] an art (technê, 198a); let us call (kalômen) teaching (didaskein) transmitting an art [e.g. the science of number (epistêmas tôn arithmôn)], learning (manthanein) receiving (paralabonta) them (e.g. numbers); and knowing (epistasthai) [let us call] keeping them in an aviary.” (198b) Socrates [hunt for knowledge = hunting birds; knowing = keeping them in an aviary] In the next section (198c–d) Socrates refers to this ‘simile’ again: ‘continuing our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of pigeons’ (apeikazontes têi tôn peristerôn ktêsei te kai thêrai).
23. “The injunction (hê epitaxis) of adding reason (logos) to right opinion (orthê doxa) might more justly be called (kaloîto dikaioteron) a blind man giving directions (typhlou parakeleusis), … very much like (pany gennaiôs eoiken) a man whose sight has darkened (ekotômenôi).” (209d–e) Socrates [adding reason to right opinion = a blind man giving directions = a man whose sight has darkened]
Theages (St I.121a–131a) = W. R. M. Lamb, LCL 1964 (1927) [Plato XII]
On Socrates’ wisdom.
According to Lamb (Introduction, 345), on the basis of stylistics (e.g. “sadly lacking in the usual of Socratic humour”) it must be considered an imitation of probably the second century B.C. “by a careful student of Plato’s writings who wished to emphasize the mystical side of Socrates.” See Appendix III-2 for the string of analogies introduced by Socrates (123b–124e) to elucidate educational instruction.
Timaeus (St III.17a–92c) = Rev. R. G. Bury, LCL 1942 (1929) [Plato VII (IX)]
On the nature of the physical world.
“Professedly a sequel to the Republic, portions of which are recapitulated in the prefatory chapter, it is also the first section of a projected trilogy, which was intended to contain also a Critias (of which only a fragment remains) and a Hermocrates.” (Introduction 3) There are three sections: (1) Introduction (19a–27c), Making of the Soul of the World (27c–69a), and Making of Man’s Soul and Body (69a–end). The last section has the majority of similes [9–33].
1. (Socrates describes his proposal for today’s discussion with a simile:) “My feeling (to pathos) may be something like (proseoike) this: such as if (hoîon ei) someone seeing beautiful creatures (zôa)—whether works of art or actually alive but in repose—he should desire to see them moving and engaged in some exercise suitable to their physique. This is what I feel regarding the state (polin) we have described.” (19b–c) Socrates [the (hypothetical) state = beautiful creatures at rest]
Timaeus is asked to do this because he is from the well-governed polis of Italian Locris where he has held high office. Socrates’ request here is reminiscent of his suggestion in the Republic (see Republic 2 [2]) that they study justice in a city rather than in a person so they can see it better.
2–3. “Again after the usual [number of] years, a heavenly flood (rheûma ouranion) comes borne along like (hôsper) a plague (nosêma) and has left you unlettered and uncultured so that again from the beginning you become as children (hoîon neoi) knowing nothing.” (23a–b) Egyptian Priest [heavenly flood = a disease; you = children] Critias repeats his grandfather’s (Critias the Elder) account (logos) as he heard it from his great-grandfather Dropides, who heard it from Solon (20e), who heard it on his visit to Sais in the Delta of Egypt from one of the priests.
4. So your genealogies which you related just now, O Solon, differ little from (brachy ti diapherei) children’s stories (mythôn).” (23b) Again, the Egyptian Priest [Greek genealogies = (children’s) stories]
5. “[The Creator] contrived (emêchanêsato) earth (gên), our nurse (trophon), [to be/as] guard (phylaka) and fashioner (dêmiourgon) of night and day.” (40b) Timaeus [earth, our nurse = guard] In the Phaedo earth is compared to something like a bowl (Phaedo [11]) and a leather ball (Phaedo [16]).
6. “Having arranged everything, he [the father of the universe] divided the souls [to make them] equal to (isarhithmous) the stars (toîs astrois) in number and assigned each to its own [star] and mounting [each on a star] as (hôs) on a chariot (es ochêma) he showed them the nature of the whole [universe].” (41d–e) Timaeus [soul on a star = on a chariot] Cf. 69c (below [10]).
7. The two divine revolutions … they bound within a sphere–shaped (sphairoeides) body.” (44d) Timaeus [shape of body = a sphere] NB the simile embedded in an adjective.
8. “It is fitting to liken (proseikasai prepei) the recipient (to dechomenon [= the substance that receives all bodies]) to the mother (mêtri), the source (to d’hothen) to the father (patri) and what is between these two (tên de metaxu toutôn) to the offspring (ekgonôi).” (50d) Timaeus [recipient = mother, source = father, what is between = offspring]
9. “Now that we have lying before us—like wood (hoîa tektosin hêmîn hulê) ready for the joiners—the various kinds of causes (ta tôn aitiôn genê diulasmena) …” (69a) Timaeus [causes = wood]
10. “[God’s sons], imitating him, considering the beginning of soul as immortal, framed around this a mortal body (thnêton sôma) and gave (edosan) all the body [as] a vehicle (ochêma) for the soul (autêi = psychê).” (69c) Timaeus [body = vehicle for the soul]
11. “[Within the soul the gods placed] a mortal form of soul which has within it firstly pleasure (hêdonên), a mighty lure to evil (delear kakoû), then pains, routers of good (agathôn phygas) and rashness and fear, both foolish counselors (aphrone xymboulô).” (69d) Timaeus [pleasure = a mighty lure to evil; pains = routers of good; rashness and fear = foolish counselors]
12–14. They implanted the form of the lung(s) (tou pleumonos) … having within it (a) cavities (sêrangas) like a sponge (hoîon spongou) (70c)—and (b) they placed it [the lung(s)] around the heart (kardian) like a padding (hoîon malagma) (70d) —(13) And the part of the soul that is desirous of food and drink … [they placed in the midriff] towards the navel (omphalon) like a manger (hoîon phatnên) for the feeding of the body (têi tou sômatos trophê). (14) —And they tied up [this part of the soul] like a savage beast (hôs thremma agrion). (70e) Timaeus [lungs = a sponge and padding; stomach = a manger and a savage beast]
15. “He fashioned the form of the liver (hêpatos) dense and smooth … so that the power of thoughts … moving [in the liver] as in a mirror (hoîon en katoptrôi) … should frighten this part of the soul.” (71b) Timaeus [the liver = a mirror] Cf. 72e.
16. “The structure of [the spleen, hê splênos, next sentence] is for the sake of the liver, to keep it bright and clean, as a wiper (hoîon … ekmageîon) that is laid beside a mirror (katoptrôi … parakeimenon).” (72c) Timaeus [spleen = a wiper beside a mirror]
17. “… and from these shapes of marrow (myelon) [i.e. the bones and marrow in the verticle column of the backbone), as from anchors (kathaper ex angkyrôn), he cast out bands of the whole soul. (73d) Timaeus [marrow = anchors]
18. “Around the marrow of neck and back He moulded vertebrae of bone (sphondylou) and set them in a vertical row like pivots (hoîon strophingas) throughout the whole trunk beginning from the head.” (74a) Timaeus [vertebrae = pivots]
19–20. “He designed (emêchanâto) the flesh [as, to be] a shield (probolê) against heat and a shelter (problêma) against the cold and so that it should yield softly and gently in case of falls, (20) like padded garments (hoîon ta pilêta esthêmata [8]). (74b) Timaeus [flesh = a shield = padded garments]
21–22. “The superior powers, as nourishment for us lesser beings, provided fluid for our bodies by cutting [veins] like channels in gardens (hoîon en kêpois ochetous) so that [each body] might receive moisture just as (hôsper) from a spring (ek namatos) coming to it.” (77c) Timaeus [veins in the body = channels in a garden; fluid from veins = a spring]
23–24. “The god [used these things] to provide water from the belly to the veins, weaving a web of air and fire (plegma ex aeros kai pyros) like a fish-trap (hoîon hoi kyrtoi) … (24) from the funnels (apo tôn engkyrtiôn) he stretched something like reeds (hoîon schoinous) in a circle throughout the whole structure. (78b) Timaeus [web of air and fire = a fish-trap; with funnels = reeds]
25–26. “With respiration the inner fire dissolves meats and drinks and disperses them through the outlets … like (hoîon) water drawn into channels from a spring and thus causes … the veins (tas phlebas) to flow through the body as through a pipe (hôsper aulônos).” (79a) Timaeus [meats and drinks = water in channels; veins flow through the body = through a pipe]
27. “and all this breathing (anepnoê, 79a) takes place as one simultaneous process (hama), like (hoîon) a revolving wheel (trochoû preiagomenoû).” (79b) Timaeus [breathing process = a wheel]
28–29. “Every living creature (pan zôon) has its inward parts around the blood and veins (peri to haîma kai tas phlebas) very hot, like a fount of fire within (hoion … pêgên tina enoûsan . . . pyros) and we have compared (kai prosêikazomen) this region already to the envelope of a fish-weel (tôi tou kyrtou plegmati).” (79d) Timaeus [hot inward parts = a fount of fire; this region = a fish-weel]
30–31. [The bile] … burning through loosens the [fibers] of the soul like the moorings of a ship (hoîon neôs peismata)” (85e) and forced through the veins into the lower region … like an exile (hoîon phygas) from a city in civil war (ek poleôs stasiasasês) falling from the body causes diarrhoea, dysentery and all such illnesses.” (86a) Timaeus [fibers of the soul = moorings of a ship; bile = an exile]
32. “And whenever a man’s seed (sperma) grows abundant in his marrow (poly kai rhyôdes peri ton muelon) like a tree that is overburdened with fruit (kathaperei dendron polykarpoteron tou xymmetrou) … he suffers many pangs and pleasures.” (86c) Timaeus [a man’s seed = a tree overburdened with fruit]
33. “Because in men the nature of the genital organs (tôn andrôn to peri tên tôn aidoiôn physin) is disobedient and tyrannical, like an animal deaf to reason (hoîon zôon anypêkoon toû logou), it tries to dominate everything through its frenzied lusts (di’ epithymias oistrôdeis). (91b) Timaeus [men’s sexuality = an animal without reason]
34. “And in women (en taîs gynaixin) too and for the same reasons the so-called (legomenai) matrix or womb (mêtrai te kai hysterai), a living creature (zôion epithymêtikon) longing to become pregnant, whenever it remains without fruit (akarpon) long beyond its due season, it takes it badly and wandering around everywhere inside the body (planômenon pantêi kata to sôma), blocking up the breathing passages …” (91c) Timaeus [a woman’s womb = an animal wandering inside her body]
35–36. “… it causes all sorts of maladies (nosous pantodapas) until the desire and passion (hê epithymia kai ho erôs) for each other unite them, like plucking fruit from trees (hoîon apo dendrôn karpon katadrepsantes), they sow invisible and unshapen (aorata … kai adiaplasta) lives into the womb as though into a ploughed field (hôs eis arouran tên mêtran aorata).” (91c–d) Timaeus [passion = plucking fruit from trees; insemination = plowing]
[1] Marian Demos, Lyric Quotation in Plato (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) 49.
[2] I will follow Ruby Blondell (and Guthrie 1978:122) in translating xenos here, as well as in Sophist and Statesman, as ‘visitor’ instead of the traditional ‘stranger’ (“The Man With No Name,” 247-266 in Plato As Author, The Rhetoric of Philosophy, edited by Ann N. Michelini, Boston, 2003), to avoid “the misleading resonances of the English [word] stranger” (251n11).
[3] Stavros Tsitsiridis (Platons Menexenos, 1998), mentions (55) Menexenus’ prominent family and promising political career as Plato’s reasons for choosing him as partner for Socrates in this Dialogue.
[4] Charles H. Kahn, “Plato’s Funeral Oration: The Motive of the Menexenus,” Classical Philology 58 (1963), 220-234, argues that Plato wanted to express a “negative judgment on Periclean Athens” (224) and that his “target was the Periclean funeral oration” (232).
[5] See McCall’s Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison (Harvard University Press, 1969) 13.
[6] See Jean-François Matéi’s summary discussion of the use of the number “five” in Plato (parts of the soul, virtue, etc.) in his essay “The Theater of Myth in Plato” included in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, edited by Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (1988), 79-82. He refers to his book L’Etranger et le Simulacre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), especially 388-89 and 549-51, for fuller discussion.
[7] Commentary (1902; 2nd edition, 1963, ed. D. A. Rees), volume 2, 58. Adam provides a line drawing of the ‘divided line’ (63), as does Keith Quincy, Plato Unmasked: The Dialogues Made New (Eastern Washington University Press, Spokane, Washington, 2003) 294.
[8] A. E. Taylor’s conjecture for ktêmata (mss).